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IS THE CONSTITUTION SPECIAL?
Christopher Serkin† & Nelson Tebbe‡
“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.” If there was such a danger when Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote those words, there is none today. Americans regularly assume that the Constitution is special, and
legal professionals treat it differently from other sources of
law. But what if that is wrongheaded? In this Article, we
identify and question the professional practice of constitutional exceptionalism. First, we show that standard arguments from text, structure, and history work differently in
constitutional law. Second, we examine the possible justifications for such distinctive interpretation among lawyers, and
we find them mostly unconvincing. Neither entrenchment, nor
supremacy, nor democratic legitimacy sets the Constitution
apart from other sources of law in a way that supports interpretive exceptionalism. In fact, the best argument for the practice is simply that the Constitution is regarded as unique—
that it occupies a privileged place in American culture and
political mythology. But even if that status can justify applying some specialized methods to the document, it cannot explain every markedly divergent practice that we see among
contemporary legal professionals. In the conclusion, we reveal
one normative motivation for the project. All too often, constitutional argument is deployed in ordinary politics as a kind of
trump, with the purpose and effect of shutting down policy
debate. Legal professionals contribute to this tactic when they
craft rarified interpretive methods without justification. Demythologizing constitutional law undercuts its use as a political
blunderbuss.
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INTRODUCTION
“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”1 That admonition from Chief Justice John Marshall has become gospel for American lawyers. It has been
called “the single most important utterance in the literature of
constitutional law.”2 And the idea it stands for, that constitutional interpretation is an exceptional enterprise, is now taken
for granted by legal professionals. If there was a danger of
forgetting the specialness of the Constitution when Chief
Justice Marshall wrote those words, there is none currently.
But what if that is a mistake? In this Article, we identify
and examine the practice of constitutional exceptionalism
among mainstream lawyers, judges, lawmakers, and academics. We put forward two principal arguments. First, we show
that constitutional law is in fact subject to special interpretive
methods as compared to other sources of law, such as statutes
and common-law precedents. Take for example historical arguments based on a law’s enactment. Constitutional discourse
regularly invokes original intent or meaning, and interpreters
can find the history dispositive.3 The role of history in statutory interpretation is different. While legal professionals will
1

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 534 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970).
3
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (purporting to adopt original understanding of Second Amendment); People v. Nutt, 677
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 2004) (“Our goal in construing our Constitution is to discern
the original meaning attributed to the words of a constitutional provision by its
ratifiers.”); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349,
2355 (2015) (justifying originalism on the positive ground that constitutional
practice, in fact, makes original meaning “the ultimate criterion for constitutional
law”); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599,
599 (2004) (“Originalism regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at
2
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sometimes look to legislative history to discern the meaning of
a statute, drafters of statutes receive nothing like the deference
given to framers like James Madison or Alexander Hamilton.
This is the most obvious but by no means the only way in
which history is used differently.4
Textual interpretation likewise looks markedly different in
the constitutional setting. The text written by the framers ends
up mattering less than the text of statutes, perhaps to the
surprise of laypeople. We support that claim below. But our
basic point is more general and less contentious, namely that
the practice of interpreting constitutional language is distinct
from interpreting other sources of law. Overall, what varies is
not necessarily the scope of each discourse (e.g., whether historical argument is included within the set of accepted moves
in both areas) but rather its shape—that is, how persuasive a
way of arguing is seen to be within the domain. The shape of
interpretive argument sets constitutional law apart from statutory law and the common law in ways that have not been fully
catalogued before.
Does this observed constitutional exceptionalism make
sense? In fact, and this is our second main argument, there
are few compelling reasons to interpret the Constitution differently from statutes, regulations, common law precedents, and
other sources of law. When people seek to justify that practice—if they think about it at all—they are likely to cite a few
characteristics of the Constitution as support. They can be
expected to say, for one, that it represents a binding precommitment that is immune to majoritarian change through the
normal legislative process. Statutes can always be amended or
repealed, and the common law can be supplanted by legislation, but the Constitution can be altered only through Article V,
which is famously unworkable as a practical matter.5 In fact,
however, the Constitution is more ordinary in this regard than
it might initially seem, both because it is malleable as well, and
because other sources of law can be equally entrenching. As
one of us has argued, entrenchment exists along a spectrum,
the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional
interpretation in the present.”).
4
For others, see infra subpart I.B.
5
See U.S. CONST. art. V; see also R. B. Bernstein, Preface to CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS, 1789 TO THE PRESENT, at xiv (Kris E. Palmer ed., 2000) (“Of the more
than 10,000 constitutional amendments proposed in Congress since 1789, 33
(about one-third of one percent of the total number proposed) have emerged from
Congress; of those, 27 (about one-fourth of one percent of the total number
proposed) have become part of the Constitution.”).
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and the Constitution is not necessarily more fixed in practice
than all other sources of law.6 Consider which is more likely:
that the death penalty will be found to be unconstitutional, or
that rent control will end in New York City. Rent control is
sticky to a degree that many constitutional provisions are not,
and it is not anomalous in that regard. Even some aspects of
the common law are surprisingly immune to regular democratic change. The public trust doctrine, most famously, can
prevent a state government from alienating property, even if the
entire electorate demands a sale.7 While the Constitution entrenches, then, it does not do so uniquely.
Another possible rationale is that the Constitution is specially legitimated. It deserves exceptional interpretive treatment because it was drafted and ratified through a procedure
designed to ensure that it enjoyed widespread public support.
But this, too, cannot be quite right. Other laws have similar
claims to overwhelming popular assent, from the Judiciary Act
of 1789, to the Sherman Antitrust Act, to major civil rights acts
of the Second Reconstruction.8 Even more importantly, the
Constitution’s claim to special democratic legitimacy requires
ignoring the inconvenient fact that more than half of the adult
population was ineligible to ratify the original Constitution.
Democratic flaws have characterized important amendments
as well.
So neither entrenchment over time nor ratification by the
people clearly separates out the Constitution. Nor do other
leading candidates for uniqueness isolate the Constitution in a
way that warrants special interpretive practices.9 Some might
immediately respond that the Constitution is different from
other sources of law in another way, namely that it was written
using broad terms so that it could endure well beyond the
typical life of a statute. But we question that rationale, too.10
Think for example of the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Sherman Antitrust Act. While those laws share several features with the Constitution—they are not only broadly worded
but enduring and widely accepted—good lawyers would not
6
Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 882 (2011).
7
Id. at 883.
8
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2014) (arguing that the civil rights laws of the 1960s have landmark
status and constitutional significance). But cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
9
See infra subpart II.C (supremacy) and subpart II.D (moral perfectionism).
10
See infra subpart II.A (form and subject matter).
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interpret them by citing the intentions of their sponsors, the
way they regularly rely on the views of Madison or Hamilton to
interpret the Constitution. In fact, there is little about the
Constitution that explains professional practices.
One reason for special treatment is more promising than
the others, namely that Americans commonly regard the
Constitution as exalted. That rationale might seem circular—
the Constitution is special because citizens view it as special—
but it is better understood to refer to an aspect of the political
culture that is incontrovertible. People do think about our basic law differently: they venerate it. Viewed in historical perspective, the Constitution’s universal popularity is actually
remarkable, particularly given the deep divisions that otherwise characterize contemporary America.11 Few other aspects
of the nation’s political or cultural life draw the same kind of
consensus. Perhaps that alone can explain how the document
is treated.
On closer inspection, however, even the Constitution’s revered status falls short of justifying every kind of interpretive
and argumentative approach that we see in practice. Largely,
that is because its place within American mythology is relatively independent of its content, and has much more to do
with its symbolic functions. Citizens can and do invoke the
document’s authority ritualistically while arguing for a range of
divergent substantive interpretations.12 Cultural authority
does not yield interpretive argument in any simple way. In
sum, while we do not reject the possibility that, in theory, a
hallowed place in American politics and history could justify
certain interpretive moves, we do not believe this rationale can
explain all aspects of the distinctive constitutional methodologies that are deployed in everyday legal practice.
To help make that point, we develop a framework for analyzing justificatory failure: we ask whether there are gaps be11
Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 103
CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2015). Other scholarship similarly highlights the relative
novelty of constitutional exceptionalism. Philip Hamburger argues that at the
time of the founding, judges did not think of “judicial review” as a special category.
Judges “mad[e] [constitutional] decisions in the same way they made any other
decisions—in accord with the law of the land.” PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 17–18 (2008); see also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT,
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 129–30 (2013) (arguing that the framers
applied substantially similar interpretive methods to the Constitution and to
statutes).
12
Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 8) (on file with authors) (describing constitutional invocations as “continuity tenders” that are largely symbolic).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN303.txt

706

unknown

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 6

3-MAR-16

9:40

[Vol. 101:701

tween the Constitution’s attributes, its claims to authority, and
the peculiar interpretive arguments that apply to the document. By attributes, we mean characteristics or features that
set the document apart from other sources of law. By authority, we mean claims to obedience that the Constitution makes
on government actors. And by arguments, we mean interpretive moves that seek to fix the meaning of the document based
on text, structure, history, and the like. Here, we are focused
on the last of these—constitutional argument—and on whether
its distinctive forms can be justified. The framework helps us
to isolate and interrogate common justifications of special constitutional argument based on its attributes and forms of authority. As it turns out, those justifications are far less
convincing than many assume.
This Article may be the first to interrogate constitutional
exceptionalism, but it builds on a nascent strain in constitutional theory. For example, Richard Primus has argued that
the criteria that determine whether a rule enjoys constitutional
status should be unbundled, so that not every rule we think of
as constitutional must share all the attributes commonly associated with that status.13 Others have questioned the distinctive procedural or remedial rules that courts apply in
constitutional cases,14 or they have debated the differences
between constitutional and statutory interpretation without
examining the common law.15 This Article goes further than
the existing scholarship, addressing the distinctiveness of constitutional argument in a way that is comprehensive and foundational. To be sure, some may object by arguing that we have
missed a constitutional trait that does, in fact, justify a distinct
interpretive practice. We think not, but we invite such a criticism precisely because it takes seriously our objection—so far
ignored in professional circles—that uniquely constitutional
arguments must be justified by distinctive constitutional attributes. We canvass the leading candidates and find them
mostly lacking.
13
Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079,
1083 (2013); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 8 (arguing that certain civil rights
statutes have constitutional status).
14
See generally Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV.
683, 694–712 (2013).
15
Compare Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory
Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22–45 (2004) (defending the differences
between statutory and constitutional interpretation), with William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (critiquing those differences).
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Part I makes the case that the Constitution is in fact
treated as special. It shows how the text is comparatively unimportant in constitutional law, how originalism differs from
interpretation based on legislative history, how structural argument takes a different form in statutory interpretation, and
how stare decisis oscillates in each setting. It also examines
metainterpretive arguments designed to mediate among these
appeals to text, structure, and history, and it contends that,
here too, the constitutional versions of such arguments are
exceptional. Part II then tests the proposition that the differences we observe are insufficiently justified by the
Constitution’s attributes and claims to authority, including its
form and subject matter, its entrenchment, its democratic legitimacy, its supremacy, and its ostensible normative perfectionism. Part II also considers whether the Constitution might
be set apart in a polythetic way by a distinctive cluster of characteristics, rather than by one differentiating attribute. Finally, we address the Constitution’s place in American politics,
culture, and society. Again, we think this last feature presents
the strongest argument for constitutional exceptionalism but
that it falls short of a full justification.
In the conclusion, we reveal one motivation for the project.
Today in American politics, the Constitution too often functions as a kind of trump. Political actors feel that evoking
higher law will overwhelm all manner of careful policy arguments by their opponents, or force them to escalate their rhetoric to match. Constitutional law, in short, is deployed as a
conversation stopper. That move can work partly because of
the Constitution’s mythological status among legal professionals. If lawyers viewed the Constitution as law, subject to interpretation that is not different in kind from what they apply to
other legal sources, that would weaken efforts to deploy the
document to squelch deliberation in ordinary politics, at least
at the margins, and it would promote genuine conversation
about what the American Constitution should require of citizens and their government. While our motivation for framing
the question therefore has a normative dimension, we bracket
the broader question of what should follow from our argument.
Our primary aim is to unsettle the contemporary consensus
around constitutional exceptionalism.
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I
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Legal actors in America typically assume that the
Constitution is special, and they treat it accordingly. They argue over its meaning—that is, they interpret it as law—in ways
that are distinct from the way they talk about statutory and
common law. While exceptions undoubtedly appear, our aim
in this Part is to characterize the norms of lawyerly argument.
We are seeking to capture the implicit rules that govern the
working culture of American law. That does not involve taking
a position in debates between, say, originalists and living constitutionalists. Rather, it entails showing whether and how
arguments from both sides carry authority among constitutional interpreters.
According to a widely accepted typology, only a few types of
interpretative argument are recognized as persuasive within
actual constitutional practice. In a classic work, Philip Bobbitt
showed that appeals to text, history, structure, precedent,
prudentialism, and constitutional ethos all carry authority.16
He argued that his list was exclusive. Other arguments—like
those drawing on theology, aesthetics, or random chance—do
not count as authoritative.17 Likewise, Richard Fallon identified a similar set of interpretive strategies that he perceived to
be accepted in constitutional practice.18 And Robert Post argued that all legitimate interpretation of the Constitution can
be classified as either doctrinal, historical, or what he called
responsive.19
Almost all of these modes of constitutional argument have
analogues in statutory and private law.20 And yet, as we will
show in this Part, there are significant differences. Moreover,
higher-order strategies for mediating conflicts among these

16
Bobbitt’s six modalities of constitutional argument are: textual, structural,
historical (by which he meant something close to originalist), doctrinal, prudential, and ethical. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991);
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982).
17
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 16, at 6.
18
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1987).
19
Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
13, 19 (1990).
20
Cf. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV.
479, 482–83 (2013) (applying modalities of constitutional interpretation to
statutes).
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recognized forms of interpretation also diverge, as we will show
before concluding this Part.21
A few preliminary clarifications are in order. First, our
objective is to characterize conventional legal interpretation in
a variety of settings. This necessarily involves generalizations.
The goal, in our terminology, is to capture the broad shape of
legal interpretation in different settings, and not all of the details. Our focus is therefore less on cutting-edge legal scholarship that pushes interpretive boundaries (although we discuss
it where appropriate) and more on the heartland of legal argument. We frequently refer to the intuitions and typical attitudes of lawyers and legal professionals. We are interested in
the kinds of interpretive moves that are likely to appear in
briefs and judicial opinions, and that inform conventional understandings of law. We naturally rely on legal scholarship,
too, but our attention in this descriptive Part is trained on the
mainstream and not on the outliers.
Second, we maintain that the Constitution is the right unit
of analysis, even while we acknowledge that there might be
exceptions. That is, lawyers generally think of the Constitution
as an interpretive category to which they apply the same set of
(special) arguments, although there may be exceptions that
take the form of particular provisions that are more like statutes or common-law rules.22 Conversely, we recognize that
some statutory provisions may be analyzed like constitutional
provisions, but we again take these to be uncommon.23
Whether our intuition here is correct is not amenable to any
21
But see LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING
221–22 (2008) (“Our view—and we believe it is the ordinary view—is that interpreting a constitution is not different in any material way from interpreting a
statute.”). Alexander and Sherwin’s argument, however, operates at a higher level
of generality than ours, and its purpose is to persuade readers to prioritize authorial intention in both contexts. Accordingly, there is less tension between our
claims in this Part than it might seem.
22
Richard Primus, for example, has recently argued that not all constitutional provisions are equally constitutional. See Primus, supra note 13. His work
is important in part because it is novel, and so we neither adopt nor reject his
perspective here when we set out conventional constitutional practice.
23
Here we do not mean to refer to statutes that incorporate constitutional
terms by reference. Those are easy to assimilate to our model because they
simply import constitutional terms and techniques. Think for example of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), or the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012), both of
which explicitly seek to revive older constitutional jurisprudence, giving it statutory force. But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772
(2014) (stating that “nothing in the text of RFRA as originally enacted suggested
that the statutory phrase ‘exercise of religion under the First Amendment’ was
meant to be tied to this Court’s pre-Smith interpretation of that Amendment”).
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easy empirical test, but we believe it characterizes mainstream
practice, and we trust that readers will find our characterization of the shape of legal argument familiar.
Third, we do not foreclose here the possibility that specific
constitutional provisions, statutes, or common-law principles
should be subject to specific forms of interpretation for distinct
normative reasons. The rule, for example, that remedial statutes should be liberally construed may be justified by special
characteristics of such statutes.24 Likewise, we can at least
imagine arguments for interpreting particular constitutional
provisions based on their distinctive histories, characteristics,
and purposes.25 We take no position on that here. Our argument operates on a larger scale: that the Constitution as a
whole is subject to special interpretive moves that are not justified by characteristics or attributes of the Constitution as a
whole.
Fourth, we bracket state constitutions in this Article. Our
reason for making this choice reinforces the intuition motivating our broader argument. While there is some ongoing debate
in the literature, most observers agree that state constitutions
are importantly different from the federal Constitution because, for example, they are written differently,26 they are easier to amend,27 and they usually do not contain grants of power
(like those found in the federal counterpart) but only limit
states’ inherent police power.28 These differences have caused
some commentators to ask whether state constitutions are
even “constitutional” as conventionally understood.29 Instead
of answering that question, we elide it altogether. However, we
note that when commentators even formulate an inquiry in
these terms, they are implicitly adopting the view that constitu24
See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 937–40 (1992).
25
Cf. Primus, supra note 13 (arguing for treating different provisions differently for the purpose of determining whether they count as constitutional).
26
See Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837, 839 (2011) (pointing out that Alabama’s constitution is over 350,000 words long, as compared to the 8700 words in the federal
Constitution).
27
Id.
28
See Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the
Federal Constitution, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1035, 1045–46 (2011); see also Joseph
Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323,
360 (2011) (“The federal government, of course, can act only pursuant to its
enumerated powers, while states have the police power and can act unless
prohibited.”).
29
See James A. Gardner, What is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J.
1025, 1029 (1993); Landau, supra note 26.

R
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tional interpretation is somehow distinct. Whether and how
state constitutional practices resemble federal constitutional
practices is an interesting and important issue, but it does not
affect our argument.
As a fifth and final point, we anticipate and address a possible objection to our claim in this Part. A reasonable person
could read through our analysis and conclude that constitutional law is not special, but just different. For that person, the
three sources of law that we highlight—constitutional, statutory, and common law—simply have distinct features that require different sorts of interpretive arguments. Constitutional
discourse differs from the other two in just the same way as
they differ from each other. Although that reading is possible,
we draw a different conclusion from this Part, especially when
it is considered together with Part II. We believe that constitutional interpretation is indeed special, and not just different,
for two related reasons. First, the gaps are particularly wide
between interpretive arguments, on the one hand, and the
Constitution’s attributes and claims to authority, on the other.
As we will show in Part II, the strongest justification comes
from the Constitution’s cultural status—that is, from the perception of specialness itself—yet even that rationale is not completely satisfying. Second, constitutional interpretation is
regarded by professionals as exceptional. Imagine legal actors
encountering a new source of law—akin to agency regulation in
the late nineteenth century.30 Our sense is that they would not
look to constitutional law for an interpretive model. They
would analogize instead to statutory or common-law interpretation. That thought experiment concretizes the intuition that
constitutional practice works not just differently but in an exceptional way that is unique and limited to constitutional
interpretation.
At the end of the day, however, our argument is fundamentally about the mismatch between the distinctive features of
constitutional argument and the Constitution’s attributes and
claims to authority. That mismatch persists whether interpretations of the Constitution are special in a rarified sense or
simply different. A reasonable person could therefore disagree
with this aspect of our diagnosis and still embrace the ultimate
30
We bracket interpretation of regulations in this Article for reasons of space,
focusing instead on statutes and the common law as the core comparators, but we
acknowledge its importance. See generally Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 360 (2012) (endorsing distinctive interpretation of
regulations).
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argument. In the rest of this Part, we lay out the differences in
interpretive argument that set constitutional discourse apart
from argumentation about other laws.
A. Text
One of the easiest places to spot constitutional exceptionalism is in textual interpretation. In practice, the text of the
Constitution actually matters less than the text of statutes,
and the wording of common-law documents matters least of all.
At first blush, none of this is the least bit obvious. After all,
courts and commentators often claim that the process of interpreting text is the same whether the text is found in the
Constitution or a statute.31 Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, has directly embraced this interpretive symmetry in his
academic writing: “What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the
text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”32 And a majority of the Court embraced that view in Heller, where it reasoned
that the textual structure of the Second Amendment should be
interpreted just like the text of “other legal documents of the
founding era.”33
Moreover, if texts are to be treated differently, one might
think that constitutional text would be taken more seriously
than statutory language. If law is seen as a command given by
an authority, and constitutional law a command by the highest
authority, then its words should carry disproportionate force.34
The text of the Constitution demands a kind of adherence or
even allegiance that other sources of law cannot compel. Yet
comparing the reality of constitutional and statutory interpre31
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is “fundamentally similar” to constitutional interpretation);
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, 23–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (endorsing the use of textualism
in both statutory and constitutional contexts).
32
Scalia, supra note 31, at 38; see also Stack, supra note 15, at 15 (discussing a “convergence of constitutional and statutory interpretation”).
33
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) (comparing the
textual structure of the Second Amendment to that of other contemporaneous
laws).
34
David Strauss explains that one account of law sees it as an order from a
boss: it is binding on us because it issues from a person or entity with authority to
command. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36–37 (2010). If that is
right, then you might expect the command of a more authoritative source to carry
greater authority.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN303.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 13

IS THE CONSTITUTION SPECIAL?

3-MAR-16

9:40

713

tation demonstrates that this intuition has it exactly
backwards.35
Consider, as just one example, the interpretation of the
phrase “public use” in the Fifth Amendment. The Takings
Clause has been interpreted as imposing a number of limitations on government power, one of which is that the government may only take private property for a public use.36 “Public
use,” in other words, imposes a substantive limit on government power. This, however, is not what the constitutional text
actually says, considered on its own terms. Jed Rubenfeld has
raised this “small matter of the constitutional text” and has
pointed out that the provision requiring that private property
“shall not ‘be taken for public use without just compensation’
. . . . ’does not read “shall not be taken except for public use and
not without just compensation.”‘“37 Looking closely and seriously at the Constitution’s text, the phrase “public use” does
not appear to impose an independent constraint on government action, but instead appears to define those categories of
“takings” for which compensation is actually due.38 For
Rubenfeld, those categories are limited to takings for actual
use, as opposed to mere limitations on use.39 No court has
embraced this aspect of Rubenfeld’s argument, and indeed
none seems even to have wrestled with the actual text of the
Takings Clause with the same degree of seriousness.40 The
meaning of the public use clause is well settled despite its
apparent tension with the language of the Fifth Amendment.
35
See, e.g., id. at 33–34 (predicting that in most cases “the text of the
Constitution will play, at most, a ceremonial role” and contrasting statutory
cases, where arguments “usually focus on the precise words of the statute”). For
enlightening examples, see Primus, supra note 12 (manuscript at 14–15).
36
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
37
Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1119 (1993) (quoting William
B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 591
(1972)).
38
See id. at 1119–20. In fairness, Rubenfeld does not claim that his interpretation is the only possible one, only that it is the most natural. “The point is not
that no reader of English could construe the Fifth Amendment as takings doctrine
construes it, nor that a more natural reading of the Constitution’s grammar is
necessarily dispositive. But surely there is value in reading our Constitution with,
not against, its textual grain.” Id. at 1119.
39
See id. at 1119–20.
40
A number of courts have relied on other aspects of Rubenfeld’s argument.
See, e.g., Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
demolition of a building did not constitute a taking because the property was not
taken for an actual public use); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d
900, 921 (Cal. 1995) (recognizing the “function performed by the just compensation clause in preserving the autonomy of individuals against the government by
restraining the government’s motive to take over their private property for its own
ends and uses”).
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Equally striking examples come immediately to mind.
Courts and lawyers simply ignore the plain text of the
Constitution when they apply the Equal Protection Clause to
the federal government despite the fact that by its terms it only
constrains the states.41 The text of the First Amendment refers
only to “Congress,”42 and yet it is routinely thought to apply to
enforcement by the executive branch as well—for example, in
overbreadth cases.43 Article III requires juries for all criminal
trials except impeachment,44 and yet bench trials are common
with the defendant’s consent.45 You might even think of the
Establishment Clause, which actually says nothing about the
separation of church and state and instead prohibits only laws
“respecting an establishment of religion.”46 Although of course
the text is capacious enough to include a separationist principle, our point is that many lawyers, like many citizens, might
be surprised to learn that the phrase “separation of church and
state” does not appear anywhere in the document. That is how
distant the text remains from quotidian lawyering.
Not that such engagement with constitutional text is impossible or unilluminating. Nicholas Rosenkranz has demonstrated that attention to the grammatical “objects” and
“subjects” of the Constitution can generate provocative doctrinal consequences at odds with some contemporary constructions of constitutional provisions.47 The fact that rigorous
attention to constitutional text marks out such a distinctive
approach to constitutional interpretation highlights its relative
rarity in professional practice.48 Constitutional interpretation
41
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). This phenomenon, called reverse incorporation, is well known and even justified as constitutional law, but it
has little or no basis in the text of the Constitution itself. See Richard A. Primus,
Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 976–77, 989 (2004).
42
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1209, 1253–57, 1253 n.166 (2010).
44
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
45
See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277–78 (1942)
(holding that a defendant may consent to waiving the constitutional right to a jury
trial); Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1542–43 (2006) (noting that 27% of federal felony cases
that went to trial from 1998 to 2002 were bench trials).
46
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2011); Rosenkranz, supra note 43, at 1210.
48
But see David S. Yellin, The Elements of Constitutional Style: A Comprehensive Analysis of Punctuation in the Constitution, 79 TENN. L. REV. 687, 688–92
(2012) (paying such attention to constitutional text by “parsing the punctuation
marks of the Constitution”).
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often strays so far from the text that readers can be confident of
only one thing when reading a constitutional provision: it is
almost certain not to mean precisely what it says.49
The contrast with statutory interpretation is striking.
Close reading of statutory text is, of course, commonplace.
Courts frequently focus on grammatical structure.50 They interpret verbs according to the placement of a modifier within a
sentence,51 and they engage in careful analysis of the significance of punctuation.52 In addition to familiar canons of construction, like expressio unius est exclusio alterius53—which
applies also to constitutional interpretation—courts have developed more precise ones to deal with textual interpretation,
like “where general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.”54
Admittedly, even with such close attention, statutory text
still often does not resolve the outcome of specific legal disputes.55 Statutory canons of construction conflict with each
49
This distinctive approach to interpretation is key to the distinction theorists are now drawing between the “big-C Constitution,” the written one, and the
“small-c constitution,” the set of entrenched norms and rules that gets articulated
in court precedents, official practices, institutional structures, and so on. See
STRAUSS, supra note 34, at 34–35; Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The
Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 700–01
(2011). This lower-case constitutionalism is the one that does most of the work in
actual cases.
50
See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F.
Supp. 2d 127, 141–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The ‘after due notice and opportunity for
hearing’ clause is setoff by commas and immediately precedes the words ‘issue an
order withdrawing approval,’ indicating that the ‘notice’ clause modifies the ‘issue
an order’ clause and not the findings clause.”).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Liranzo, 729 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (citing W. STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 30 (3d ed. 1979)
(interpreting a modifier to apply to the verb closest to it)).
52
See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 176
(2d Cir. 2011) (defining “underwriters” with reference to “the fact that the distribution requirement [in the statute] is set off from the two antecedent activities by
a comma”); see also Lance Phillip Timbreza, Note, The Elusive Comma: The Proper
Role of Punctuation in Statutory Interpretation, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 63, 67 (2005)
(discussing how the Supreme Court has developed “Punctuation Doctrines” for
statutory interpretation).
53
“[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of
the alternative.” Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
54
See Healthkeepers, Inc. v. Richmond Ambulance Auth., 642 F.3d 466, 474
(4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115
(2001) for the ejusdem generis principle).
55
One of us wrote a student note on the word “the” in a statute, identifying a
circuit split over an ambiguous referent. Christopher Serkin, The Offense: Interpreting the Indictment Requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 851, 98 MICH. L. REV. 827,
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other and can become mere instrumental tools for an outcomedriven court.56 But despite the very difficult problems at the
edges, courts generally pay close attention to statutory language and find that it often determines the outcome of cases.
They very rarely actively flaunt the plain meaning of the text,
and then only after elaborate justifications and explanations
for doing so.57
For practitioners and consumers of judicial opinions, this
observation is largely banal and is exemplified in Lamie v.
United States Trustee.58 There, recent changes to the Bankruptcy Code eliminated awards of attorney’s fees except for
attorneys appointed under another provision of the Code.59
The plaintiff, however, argued that this reflected a drafting error, and that a critical phrase had been unintentionally omitted
from the new statutory provisions.60 The plaintiff’s argument
relied both on a comparison with the predecessor statute,
which was nearly identical and included the language in question, and with the grammar of the new statute, which appeared
incorrect without the missing language.61 The Court, however,
refused to find any ambiguity and relied solely on the text itself.
The Court reasoned that “[t]he statute is awkward, and even
ungrammatical; but that does not make it ambiguous on the
point at issue.”62 It concluded “[t]his is not a case where a ‘not’
is missing or where an ‘or’ inadvertently substitutes for an
‘and.’ The sentence may be awkward; yet it is straightfor831–36 (1999) (examining whether “the offense” referred to the present or a previous indictment).
56
See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 405 (1950); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 276 (1985) (“[F]or every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is
an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that
there is a canon to support every possible result.”).
57
See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458–59
(1892) (departing from Congress’s use of the term “alien” who is “perform[ing]
labor or service of any kind” to exclude a member of the clergy because of historical evidence showing that legislators did not intend to include such laborers).
58
540 U.S. 526 (2004).
59
See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2000) (“[T]he court may award to a trustee, an
examiner, a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 . . . .”);
Lamie, 540 U.S. at 529–31.
60
See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 533.
61
See id. The list of permissible awardees is missing a final conjunction. To
be grammatically correct, as written, the awards should be made to “an examiner
[or] a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103.” The lack of the
critical “or” suggests that the list was intended to continue.
62
Id. at 534.
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ward.”63 The analysis begins and ends with the words of the
statute.
Empirical study, to the degree that it exists, confirms the
importance of textual considerations in statutory interpretation. Even where courts have not adopted textualism as such,
with its insistence on the exclusivity (or necessary priority) of
textual considerations over others, they continue to emphasize
actual wording more than do courts confronting constitutional
issues. For example, Nicholas Zeppos finds that in the
Supreme Court “text is often the starting point for resolving
statutory cases,”64 that the average decision cites text more
commonly than any other source,65 and that textual sources
dominate over both historical authorities66 and “dynamic” considerations like practical concerns and social forces.67 This
matches Jonathan Molot’s sense that there is in fact a consensus among courts that text should be given great weight in
statutory interpretation, and that context matters even if disagreement persists on the narrower questions of what evidence
should be relevant and how relevant it should be.68 Similarly,
Abbe Gluck’s empirical study of statutory interpretation among
state high courts found that there is a surprising consensus in
favor of “modified textualism,” according to which the text of
statutes has disproportionate significance even if it does not
control interpretation to the degree that pure textualists would

63
Id. at 535. But see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493–96 (2015)
(correcting ambiguity in text of Affordable Care Act). King is ultimately consistent
with our argument that the text is paramount in statutory interpretation. The
Court reasoned that its approach, in the face of “inartful drafting” is to “do our
best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.” Id. at 2492 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)).
64
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1106 (1992).
65
See id. at 1114.
66
See id. at 1104, 1119 (finding after an empirical study that textual sources
dominate over historical sources); id. at 1118 (finding that legislative history is not
used to override clear textual language); cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?: Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in
the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 229 (2006) (finding, after an
empirical study of Supreme Court cases on workplace law, that legislative history
has declined over time as an important factor, and attributing the decline to the
influence of Justice Scalia).
67
See Zeppos, supra note 64, at 1119.
68
See Jonathan T. Molot, Exchange: The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
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like.69 If attention to text is prevalent among high courts, you
would expect it to be even more common among lower courts
interpreting statutory provisions for the first time.
Despite claims of interpretive symmetry, then, constitutional text is viewed as less of a constraint than statutory text
in deciding ultimate meaning. This observation is not intended
to take a position in the longstanding battle between textualists
and purposivists within the field of statutory interpretation.70
Even strong purposivist theories such as Eskridge’s dynamic
approach71 make the text determinative in many cases.72
What separates camps of statutory interpretation is not
whether textual considerations are important in many cases
but rather exactly how important they should be.73 Our observation here is more mundane and much more routine than the
nuanced debates that have occupied scholarship in the area:
there is broad agreement among lawyers and judges that statutory interpretation should begin with the text of the statute in a
process that approaches the words with interpretive sophistication and seriousness.74 What remains contested, and
strongly so, is the appropriate role of extratextual authority,
like legislative history.75 That is an important debate, yet exploring the role of textual interpretation only at the margins
69
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1758
(2010).
70
See, e.g., id. at 1762–64 (reviewing debate); John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71–77 (2006) (same); Molot,
supra note 68, at 2–5 (same).
71
See Gluck, supra note 69, at 1764 n.47 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 125 (1994)).
72
See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1483 (making it clear that “[w]hen the
statutory text clearly answers the interpretive question, therefore, it normally will
be the most important consideration,” and noting that history comprises “the next
most important interpretive consideration”); see also Molot, supra note 68, at 3,
29–30, 43 (noting that contemporary versions of purposivism agree with textualists on the importance of textual sources).
73
See Molot, supra note 68, at 3 (“[N]onadherents and adherents of textualism alike place great weight on statutory text and look beyond text to
context . . . .”).
74
See id. at 3 (acknowledging differences between textualists and
purposivists, especially concerning the use of legislative history, but emphasizing
that a consensus exists on the great importance of text and the relevance of
context, however defined). The classic case prioritizing statutory text is United
States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), where Judge Easterbrook
persuaded the court to read a statute literally, despite the fact that the result
made little sense and over the objection of Judge Posner. See Lawrence M. Solan,
Statutory Interpretation, Morality, and the Text, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1033, 1042–43
(2011) (discussing the case).
75
See Molot, supra note 68, at 3.
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can gloss over the more prosaic observation that the text controls statutory interpretation to an extent that is not generally
true of constitutional interpretation.76
Neither does our argument require us to deny that some
bits of statutory text are treated similarly to some constitutional provisions, particularly where the statute is broadly
worded or where the constitutional provision is specific. The
Sherman Antitrust Act, for instance, prohibits every “restraint
of trade,”77 while Article II requires that the President be thirtyfive years old,78 to take two well-known examples. We will argue that other modes of argument set apart interpretation of
even these provisions—no lawyer would emphasize the opinions of the individual framers of the Sherman Act, for instance.
Yet even thinking just about textual interpretation, these exceptions do not alter the general fact that constitutional text is
comparatively less important.
Interpreting the text of common-law authorities works differently still, although less differently than one might suppose.
It is tempting to think that textual interpretation in the common law is, at its core, fundamentally distinct from interpreting
the text of other sources of law, but this risks missing important similarities. After all, judicial rulings today almost always
consist of written opinions subject to subsequent interpretation. That was not always true. In its origins, the common law
was largely unwritten.79 And historically, the common law was
more a custom of rules discernible only through the actual
outcomes of legal disputes.80
Today, however, written opinions of the common law are
subjected to at least a similar kind of textual scrutiny as other
sources of law.81 This is different from the observation that the
76
That scholars now commonly distinguish between “interpretation” of the
Constitution’s semantic meaning and “construction” of doctrine around that
meaning highlights the relative irrelevance of constitutional text for both doctrine
and outcomes. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010).
77
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
78
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
79
See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1187, 1190–1204 (2007) (describing origins of the common law).
80
See id. at 1192–93 (discussing how systems of precedent require only
institutional memory, possessed in medieval England by a small group of judges
and barristers who relied on their memories of decisions).
81
See id. (tracing that change). Attention to the text of judicial opinions is
particularly interesting and complex when the court is authorized to develop
common law either by the Constitution or by a statute. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (preserving a right to a jury trial in civil cases “according to the rules of

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN303.txt

720

unknown

Seq: 20

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-MAR-16

9:40

[Vol. 101:701

common law has become increasingly codified during the twentieth century.82 The point, instead, is that the texts of judicial
opinions themselves now have the force of law through stare
decisis (discussed in subpart I.D below) and that judicial opinions are taken seriously as texts for purposes of interpreting
what the law is. Lower courts in particular parse carefully the
text of controlling authorities in their jurisdictions.83
This observation should again be familiar to all lawyers
who have spent time poring over past cases to look not only for
the outcome but for courts’ articulation of common-law principles, because those descriptions then have the force of law in
subsequent cases. Any area of the common law will demonstrate this point, but property offers some particularly good
examples. Consider the Alabama Supreme Court’s rule that
“the measure of damages [in trespass cases] is the difference in
the value of the land before and after the trespass.”84 That rule
carries through a line of Alabama Supreme Court cases, from
Brinkmeyer v. Bethea85 to Borland v. Sanders Lead Co.,86 until
the precise language is then quoted and used, in 2007, to reject
a claim for remediation damages resulting from trespass.87
This means, in many cases, that courts do not need to derive
rules from whole cloth, or construe rules anew from long lines
of cases, but can instead quote language from a leading case
and apply it to the facts at hand.
Of course, there is always a chance that the process goes
wrong, and rules articulated at one time are repeated but distorted at another. Consider, for example, the common-law rule
that people cannot own dead bodies.88 This principle has had
important doctrinal consequences for conversion claims rethe common law”); FED R. EVID. 501 (“The common law . . . governs a claim of
privilege . . . .”); cf. Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The
Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 868 (2012) (noting
that precedent has particularly strong effect in statutory cases not only with
respect to designated “common law” statutes such as the Sherman Antitrust Act
but generally).
82
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 83–85 (1999
ed.) (describing how the Restatements have acted as a codification of American
common law).
83
See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 81, at 870 (noting “the general consensus that
the Supreme Court is less constrained by precedent than lower courts”).
84
Brinkmeyer v. Bethea, 35 So. 996, 997 (Ala. 1904) (quoting 3 AMERICAN AND
ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 36 (John Houston Merrill ed., 1888)).
85
Id. This history, and the original attribution, is described in Poffenbarger v.
Merit Energy Co., 972 So. 2d 792, 795 (Ala. 2007).
86
369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
87
Poffenbarger, 972 So. 2d at 801.
88
See Mark Pawlowski, Property in Body Parts and Products of the Human
Body, 30 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 35, 36 (2009).
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garding cell lines, among others.89 The rule is well ensconced
in property. Its origins, however, appear to come from a misreading of a very early case. While opaque and contested, one
very early articulation of the rule appears to come from the
1614 Haynes’s Case.90 There, a grave robber was caught
stealing sheets off three corpses. The court ruled that the theft
was from the person who had wrapped the corpses in the
sheets and not from the corpses themselves, because “property
of the sheets remain in the owners, . . . for the dead body is not
capable of it.”91 That court, in other words, was articulating
the rule that a corpse is incapable of owning property. According to one historical account, courts (mis)interpreted the language of that original case to mean that a corpse cannot be
property.92 The point is simply this: the articulation of common-law rules comes through the language of judicial opinions, language that in turn is subject to the same kinds of
interpretive tools and pitfalls as constitutional or statutory
interpretation.
It is, therefore, sensible to compare textual interpretation
of the common law with textual interpretation of statutes and
the Constitution. The enterprise is not as fundamentally distinct as one might have supposed. But that does not mean that
the enterprise is undertaken in the same way in the context of
the common law. Indeed, the shape of its textual interpretation
is quite different from other sources of law. Yes, judicial opinions—the “text” of the common law—are written. But they are
controlling not as text qua text but instead as a description or
explication of some deeper, unwritten legal principle.93 For
this reason, it is routine and uncontroversial for a court to
89
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488–90 (Cal.
1990); see generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2d ed.
2011) (describing researchers’ treatment of one woman’s cell line and the legal
issues it implicates).
90
This account comes from Kenyon Mason & Graeme Laurie, Consent or
Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts in the Shadow of Bristol and Alder
Hey, 64 MOD. L. REV. 710, 713–14 (2001); see also Pawlowski, supra note 88
(noting that the rule may be based on a misunderstanding of Haynes’s Case).
91
Haynes’s Case (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1389, 1389; 12 Co. Rep. 113, 113.
92
Mason & Laurie, supra note 90, at 714.
93
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 248 (1990) (“Because of its conceptual character, common law is unwritten law in a profound
sense. Indeed, a common law doctrine is no more textual than Newton’s universal
law of gravitation is. The doctrine is inferred from . . . judicial opinions, but the
doctrine is not those opinions or the particular verbal formulas in them . . . .”);
STRAUSS, supra note 34, at 38 (“[A]ccording to the common law approach, you
cannot determine the content of the law by examining a single authoritative text
or the intentions of a single entity.”); see also John Gardner, Some Types of Law,
in COMMON LAW THEORY 51, 55 (Douglas E. Edlin, ed., 2007) (“Even where interpre-
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paraphrase or reframe a prior court’s language. Of course, that
happens with statutory text, too; courts sometimes paraphrase
it to make it more accessible or intelligible, and subsequent
courts may defer to that paraphrase.94 But when it comes to
the common law, subsequent articulations can have parity
with the “original” statement of a rule or principle, which exists
independent of any decision as text.95
More generally, too, lawyers treat the text of judicial opinions differently from the text of statutes. Courts’ writing is not
subjected to the same kind of careful grammatical parsing that
attends statutory interpretation, and it would be strange indeed to apply canons of construction, like expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, to a judicial opinion. Interpreters of the common law understand that courts are engaged fundamentally in
the process of justification through historical narrative, and
while courts’ output constitutes the content of the law—in a
very real sense—the text itself should be treated with less reverence than statutory commands.96 Partly, of course, this has
to do with the nature of precedent and the underlying authority
and legitimacy of the various institutions—legislatures versus
courts versus the constitutional convention—but the text itself
is treated differently as well.
True, interpreters will sometimes focus on a court’s articulation of the elements of a legal standard, asking, for example,
whether some requirements are conjunctive or disjunctive.
They look, in other words, at differences between “and” and
“or,” and the order of application of certain rules. That is especially likely when lower courts, or lawyers litigating in them,
interpret the meaning of binding opinions from higher courts in
the same jurisdiction. But these are the exceptions that illumitation of the law in the statute requires interpretation of intervening case law, the
legislative text remains the primary object of interpretation . . . .”).
94
Interestingly, as we explain in greater detail below, court interpretations of
statutory language are said to have extraordinarily strong precedential authority,
and the text of those decisions is sometimes parsed with great care. See infra text
accompanying note 154.
95
This actually has a greater resemblance to constitutional interpretation
than to statutory interpretation. The meaning of “public use” in the Takings
Clause, for example, now comes primarily from citations to previous cases identifying a separate “public use” requirement than from the text of the Clause itself.
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–84 (2005); see also supra
text accompanying notes 38–40 (describing the meaning of “public use”).
96
Gardner claims that case law is fundamentally different from other sources
of law in this respect and that it resembles customary law more than statutory
law. See Gardner, supra note 93, at 67 (“Case law, unlike legislated law, is not
made by being articulated. It is made by being used in argument.”).
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nate our underlying claim that the text of judicial opinions is
not treated with the same reverence as other sources of law.
Ultimately, the observation here should feel familiar to anyone who has ever engaged in the practice of serious legal
interpretation: the text of the Constitution is interpreted differently than the common law and statutory text. And, perhaps
curiously, constitutional interpretation falls generally in the
middle, with courts bound more by constitutional language
than by common-law judicial opinions but less than by statutory text.
B. History
Historical arguments also work differently in constitutional
law. That difference is implicit in ordinary legal practice, which
regards legislative history as one thing and the history of the
founding or the Reconstruction amendments as another thing
altogether. In this subpart, we substantiate the peculiarity of
historical argument in constitutional law.
In particular, we press two claims. First, Justice Scalia, a
leading figure among “new originalists,” spurns subjective intent in both settings, but he replaces it with historical evidence
of original meaning only in constitutional cases, relying almost
exclusively on textual arguments when it comes to statutes. To
the extent that originalists follow suit, they usually draw on
wider, contemporaneous social meanings in constitutional law
but not in statutory interpretation. This amounts to constitutional but not legislative originalism, whatever adherents may
say to the contrary. Second, arguments from the enactment
history, when they do appear, work differently in each setting.
History may actually matter less in constitutional interpretation, both because it focuses primarily on historically prominent individuals and because it focuses on particular founding
moments and not others.97 We take those two observations in
turn and then turn to the very different role of history in common-law analysis.
The constitutional originalism that dominates today relies
on history in a particular way. Roughly speaking, first-wave
97
Moreover, courts’ uses of both legislative and constitutional history have
been plagued by difficulties. See, e.g., Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and
Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1106–12 (2013) (showing that the
Court’s history of the anticommandeering rule is flawed); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
908 (2013) (examining statutory drafting and problematizing reliance on it by
courts).
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originalism focused on the subjective aims of the framers, while
today’s “new originalism” privileges only the “original meaning”
of the Constitution’s text.98 History guides interpretation in
both forms of constitutional originalism, but it does so differently. New originalists purport to place no independent weight
on the views of the framers. They reject subjective intent for
two principal reasons. First, they argue that the drafters’ subjective views cannot claim democratic legitimacy.99 Second,
they believe that only fixing the meaning of the text in an objective way, by reference to public meanings, can protect rule-oflaw values like predictability and impersonality against the
whims of contemporary constitutional actors—especially
unelected judges.100
Justice Scalia, arguably the most prominent new originalist, also rejects reliance on subjective intent in statutory interpretation, and for similar reasons.101 He believes that
determining the intentions of groups is methodologically difficult, if not philosophically incoherent, and he worries that the
exercise cannot produce determinate results capable of constraining interpreters.102 Again, indeterminacy threatens both
democracy and the rule of law. He therefore rejects intentionalism in both statutory and constitutional settings.103
Despite the professed consistency of new originalism, however, a form of constitutional exceptionalism in fact prevails
when it comes to concrete cases. When Justice Scalia is deciding cases, he tends to rely heavily on drafting history for constitutional interpretation but not for statutory interpretation.
Even statutes from the founding era appear simply as texts
without historical context. William Eskridge has noticed this
98
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 071: The New Originalism 2 (Feb.
24, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223663
[https://perma.cc/F7VT-JAGL].
99
For a challenge to this conventional way of understanding the connection
between constitutional authority and constitutional interpretation, see Adam M.
Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 606, 610–11 (2008).
100
See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 165, 167 (2008) (describing the primacy of these two arguments for
originalism).
101
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 31, at 16–23, 29–37.
102
For discussions of the difficulty of determining legislative intent, see generally Scott W. Breedlove & Victoria S. Salzmann, The Devil Made Me Do It: The
Irrelevance of Legislative Motivation Under the Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L.
REV. 419, 441–54 (2001); Colloquium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
925, 925–1183 (1978); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212–23 (1970).
103
Scalia, supra note 31, at 38.
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difference and presented it as a puzzle: Why do critics of intentionalism draw so heavily (and famously) on constitutional history but not on statutory history?104
Eskridge offers the example of Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States.105 When he is discussing that case in academic
writing, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority for relying on legislative history to interpret the meaning of an 1885 statute.106
He believes, inter alia, that relying on legislative history leaves
too much leeway for contemporary interpreters who use that
latitude to marshal evidence for their preferred reading. That
harms both democracy and rule-of-law values, so he urges
judges to focus instead on statutory text.107
Scalia’s approach to constitutional interpretation is similarly antisubjectivist, but there he believes that historical evidence of textual meaning is crucial. For example, in Printz,
Justice Scalia determined the meaning of the Tenth Amendment by reference to historical sources, chief among them The
Federalist.108 Eskridge concludes that this contrasting use of
history “can be generalized” and “has been typical of Scalia’s
jurisprudence.”109 Think for instance of Scalia’s opinion for
the Court in Heller, where contextual history of the Second
Amendment plays an important role (along with other modalities of interpretation).110 To the extent that new originalists
follow his lead, they will predictably invoke contextual history
for constitutional text but not for statutes. Historical argument
will virtually drop out of the latter, leaving a relatively pure
form of textualism.
Furthermore, where historical evidence does appear, it
works quite differently in constitutional and statutory law. In
fact—and surprisingly—the genuine historical record appears
104
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist
But Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1998);
see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 66, at 222 (finding, after an empirical
study of workplace cases, that reliance on statutory history has declined during
the Burger and Rehnquist courts, and attributing that decline to the influence of
Justice Scalia as well as Justice Clarence Thomas).
105
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
106
Scalia, supra note 31, at 29–30; see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1304
(describing Scalia’s argument).
107
Scalia, supra note 31, at 22–23.
108
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (discussing “[r]esidual
state sovereignty” expressed in the Tenth Amendment by citing to The Federalist).
109
Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1305; see Campbell, supra note 97, at
1106–07 (critiquing the Printz Court’s history of the founding era).
110
See Sara A. Solow & Barry Friedman, How to Talk About the Constitution,
25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69, 75–76, 78 (2013) (“Real judges aren’t originalists or
living constitutionalists, or any other ‘ists’ either.”).
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to matter less in constitutional interpretation. This is evident
in two different ways: lawyers disproportionately refer to iconic
founding-era framers of the Constitution while their treatment
of legislative history is more comprehensive, and they attach
only selective significance to historical instances of constitution making, whereas their invocations of legislative history are
more methodical and consistent.
Even though new originalists deny it, they seem to dwell
disproportionately on sources that speak to the subjective intent of prominent framers, who are also major figures in American revolutionary history more generally. Jamal Greene has
pointed out that framers like Madison and Hamilton play a
large role in the historical argumentation of new originalists.111
Framers like Oliver Ellsworth do not. That is true even though
new originalists distinguish themselves from first-wave
originalists precisely (or largely) by eschewing reliance on subjective intent. Citations to The Federalist and Max Farrand
have increased, not decreased, since the rise of the new
originalism, for what that is worth.112 Within those sources,
evidence from iconic figures like Madison and Hamilton are
emphasized over material from less renowned figures.113
Moreover, and importantly, originalists rely on this material
not just as evidence of original meaning but as independent
authority. Consider the fact that citations to evidence that arguably bears just as directly on original meaning—such as
antifederalist writing—have not increased.114 Those writings
should be as relevant to original meaning as the writing of the
federalists but they are invoked far less often. Apparently, they
are viewed less authoritatively because their authors do not
loom as large in Americans’ historical imagination.115 Observed patterns of argument, in short, do not support the idea
that only historical evidence of semantic meaning matters in
constitutional interpretation among new originalists.
111
Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683,
1686–87 (2012).
112
Id. at 1691.
113
To take only the most recent example, Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Defense of Marriage Act decision cites The Federalist five times—four times to
Madison and once to Hamilton—and eschews other historical evidence altogether.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (twice), 2703, 2704 (twice) (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
114
But see Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1318 (questioning the relevance of the
views of lawmakers on the losing end for figuring out the meaning of the text that
is eventually enacted).
115
Patrick Henry is arguably an exception to this generalization that antifederalists include few figures of contemporary cultural salience among their ranks.
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Relatedly, their attention to authors does not carry over to
the interpretation of statutes. There is no comparable sense
among lawyers that the sponsors of congressional acts should
have extraordinary influence over how contemporary lawyers
understand those statutes. Legislative history features committee reports and other materials that do not privilege the
views of the senators or congresspeople who proposed or
drafted a particular measure. For example, the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is a powerful
statute whose legislative history has been closely examined to
shed light on its meaning.116 Yet the views of Senator Edward
Kennedy, who championed the law, are not thought to carry
force, except insofar as they might have shaped the views of
other lawmakers.117 That is, they bear no independent
authority.
Constitutional originalism tends to undervalue history in
another way, as well. Mainstream researchers who use legislative history usually do so methodically, uncovering and combing through whatever historical evidence of Congress’s intent is
available.118 They may vary their use of legislative history depending on the statute, with statutes that are older and more
frequently litigated requiring less resort to legislative history
because of intervening precedent,119 and they may be selective
among bits of evidence, citing those that support their position
and ignoring others, but they do not ignore entire periods of
history that are somehow thought to be less authoritative.120
By contrast, constitutional originalism is much less evenly distributed among eras. For example, far less attention is paid to
the history of the Reconstruction Amendments than to the circumstances surrounding enactment of the original document
and the Bill of Rights. Greene has shown that drafters like
John Bingham—who has been called the “James Madison of

116
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012); see, e.g., Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Condemning Religion: RLUIPA and the Politics of Eminent Domain, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (mentioning Kennedy’s view of a particular issue).
117
See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 116, at 10–18 (surveying Senator
Kennedy’s views as part of a general survey of approaches to RLUIPA).
118
See, e.g., JULIA TAYLOR, CONG. RES. SERV., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RESEARCH: A
BASIC GUIDE 2–11 (2011) (describing the process of legislative history research).
119
Cf. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 66, at 224–25 (arguing, based on empirical evidence, that reliance on statutory history is greatest when a provision is
young, before court precedent or agency interpretation has become fixed).
120
Cf. id. at 224 (finding, after an empirical study of workplace cases, that use
of legislative history varies according to the age of the statute but presenting no
findings on variations according to eras of history).
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the Fourteenth Amendment”121 —are largely ignored.122
Whatever the theory, history in fact works quite differently in
legal practice.
So far in this subpart, we have been comparing the uses of
history in constitutional and statutory law. What about the
common law? The comparison to constitutional interpretation
is again revealing.
The common law’s relationship to historical meaning and
interpretation is surprisingly complex. After all, the common
law is—in a very real sense—a description of what courts have
done in the past.123 Interpreting the common law is inherently
historical in a way that interpreting the Constitution or statutes is not. The common law’s history is its very source of
authority.124 But this is a particular kind of historical interpretation that often has no use for a comprehensive historical
record. Indeed, despite the common law’s status as history,
early common-law thinkers viewed it as importantly ahistorical, and recognized as valid only those common-law doctrines
that dated back to time immemorial—i.e., that were prehistorical.125 For them, it was the fact of the historical line of cases
that determined the content of the common law, and not an
analysis of what judges thought they were doing, how the law
was understood at the time, or any other historical analysis.
Under conventional views of common-law interpretation, there
is little opportunity to ask about the personal biographies or
belief systems of early common-law judges, or about the historical context for the underlying dispute.
121
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, at 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509,
1533 (2007) (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 73–74 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
122
See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978,
979–80, 1000–01 (2012).
123
See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 551, 581 (2006); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV.
601, 602 (“In a system of law that adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis, it is
impossible to understand the law as it is today without understanding the law as
it has been in the past.” (footnote omitted)).
124
See Meyler, supra note 123 (“The theory of obligation produced by English
thinkers of the common law . . . had emphasized historicity as the source of the
authority of the common law.”).
125
See id. at 570 (quoting John Adams as describing the common law as
consisting only of rules “used time out of mind, or for a time whereof the memory
of man runneth not to the contrary” (John Adams, Letter to the Printers, BOS.
GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 1773, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 540 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1851))).
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The waning of legal formalism has changed the common
law’s relationship to its own history, to be sure. Legal rules are
no longer deployed mostly through abstract categories but instead are discussed and interpreted by reference to their function and purpose. Legitimate interpretive moves therefore
include analogizing or distinguishing prior cases based on
changes in the world. A rule that made sense at one time—like
the capture rule for finback whales—can be distinguished on
grounds that modern property should not incentivize killing
whales, and that in any case technology has evolved past the
bomb lance.126
Still, the ultimate interpretive enterprise is not to understand what a particular judge, at a particular time, intended by
his or her opinion. That history, while potentially fascinating
as a focus for academic study, is not generally a valid basis for
legal interpretation. For example, the ancient and famous case
Pierson v. Post127 has been the subject of sustained historical
treatment in recent years. Development of the historical record
has, in turn, revealed information about the beliefs and jurisprudence of the justices, complex class conflicts at the heart of
the case, and even the long-lost case roll (effectively, the original record of the litigation).128 This is all interesting, and indeed some of it makes for a gripping read. But it, too, does not
change the legal interpretation of the case, even as it radically
alters the historical meaning. As Professor James Krier incisively summarizes:
[Stuart Banner has written] that ‘the important thing about
Pierson v. Post is no longer the abstract legal principle for
which it might or might not stand. The important thing is the
story of the fox.’ I hope he doesn’t mean what he seems to
say. Filling out the story of the fox, at least as it has been
done thus far, has the pedagogical virtues [of greater enjoyment for students and instructors], but little more.129

126

See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881).
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
128
See Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson
v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1136–40 (2006) (explaining how the differing backgrounds of the justices may have influenced their beliefs); James E. Krier, Facts,
Information, and the Newly Discovered Record in Pierson v. Post, 27 LAW & HIST.
REV. 189, 189 (2009) (discussing the discovery of the lost judgment roll); Andrea
McDowell, Legal Fictions in Pierson v. Post, 105 MICH. L. REV. 735, 753–57 (2007)
(discussing the conflicts between hunters and farmers in England over
foxhunting).
129
Krier, supra note 128, at 190–91 (footnote omitted) (quoting Stuart Banner,
21st Century Fox, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 188 (2009)).
127
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But imagine, for a moment, that enterprising historians
found a previously undiscovered trove of James Madison’s
writing, offering new insights into his views of property. We
can safely surmise that the writing would not be relegated to
entertaining first-year law students and deepening the historical record but would be invoked to aid in the project of interpreting the Takings Clause. This is a dramatic difference.
For another example, consider that when Justice Harry
Blackmun’s papers were released, they offered new insights
into his and other justices’ thinking about the content and
interpretation of their opinions.130 Professor David Achtenberg
has argued, based on the Blackmun papers, that limits on
section 1983 claims in Monell v. Department of Social Services
were based on broader concerns about limiting the phrase
“under color of law.”131 This is an interesting and plausible
argument, but it is essentially off limits to a lawyer in court
arguing about the meaning of the phrase.132
In sum, historical argumentation in constitutional law is
special. New originalists who eschew subjective intent often
replace it with historical argument in constitutional interpretation but not in statutory interpretation, which tends to be textualist. And if we compare how historical argument actually
does work in both contexts, we notice that it matters differently
in constitutional law. Not only does much originalist argument
highlight individual framers, even in the hands of those who
purport to consult only original meaning, but it also selects out
a few founding moments that carry unusual authority in the
American imagination rather than systematically surveying
contextual evidence of original meaning surrounding each and
every constitutional provision. And finally, contextual history
plays almost no role in the common law. Generalizations are
dangerous, of course, but these characterizations of historical
argument should be recognizable to those familiar with the
everyday practice of law.

130

See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKSUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005).
131
See David Jacks Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion: Justice Powell, Monell, and the Meaning of “Color of Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 682 (2011).
132
Note that this is true regardless of whether Justice Blackmun was ultimately interpreting statutes or the Constitution. Our point is that lawyers cannot
interpret common-law doctrines that develop around legal texts by reference to
the history surrounding a given precedent, even if they can argue from the history
of the underlying statute or constitutional provision.
MUN’S
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C. Structure
Arguments from structure bear an authority in constitutional law that they do not enjoy in other legal domains. In fact,
they seem to play a different role in statutory interpretation,
even in the few places one might expect to find them working
similarly—namely, where statutes establish and empower governmental institutions.
By structure, we mean to refer not to the organization of
the text itself but instead to the organization of government
institutions that it creates and regulates.133 As Bobbitt described it, structural argumentation “infer[s] rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the
structures it sets up.”134 Chiefly, the structures that generate
constitutional rules are the separation of powers, meaning the
allocation of authority among branches of the federal government, and federalism, meaning the distribution of power
among federal and state governments. Structural arguments
undergird familiar rules surrounding legislative vetoes,135 commandeering under the Tenth Amendment,136 executive privilege,137 limits on the President’s removal power,138 and other
key doctrines. Such rules cannot be satisfactorily rooted in the
text alone, nor in original meanings, nor in precedent (at least
initially). Structural argumentation therefore plays an important role within constitutional law as it is actually practiced.
A canonical example is McCulloch, the source of Chief
Justice Marshall’s famous endorsement of constitutional
specialness.139 There, Marshall relied almost entirely on structural reasoning when he concluded that Maryland could not
tax the Second Bank of the United States, a branch of which
was located in the state.140 As Bobbitt notes, Marshall declined to identify any particular textual provision to support
133
Sometimes textualists refer to the “structure” of a statute to help discover
its meaning, but that is a distinct use of the term—it refers to the architecture of
the text rather than to the governmental structures that the law sets up. See
Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1109–10 & n.22 (describing that usage).
134
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 16.
135
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–58 (1983).
136
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–25 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–77 (1992).
137
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–08 (1974).
138
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1935).
139
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
140
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 16, at 15 (“McCulloch v.
Maryland, the principal foundation case for constitutional analysis, relies almost
wholly on structural approaches.”).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN303.txt

732

unknown

Seq: 32

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-MAR-16

9:40

[Vol. 101:701

the conclusion nor did he offer arguments from the history of
the framing. Instead, he reasoned that if a state could tax a
federal entity like the bank, that would not only threaten the
existence of the bank but also impose costs on people not represented in the state legislature.141 Bobbitt notes that McCulloch, though canonical, is not anomalous in relying on
structural reasoning, for “[t]here are many recent, celebrated
examples of this form of argument to be found in the cases of
the US Supreme Court.”142
Another leading example is Humphrey’s Executor, where
the Court upheld a limitation on the President’s ability to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) based
on a structural analysis of the FTC’s place in the separation of
powers scheme.143 The Court reasoned that the FTC was created to perform important legislative and judicial functions in
addition to executive ones, and therefore it could not be characterized as a mere “arm or an eye” of the President.144 Structural arguments are familiar in constitutional law. They work
very differently, however, in statutory law.
At first, it might seem obvious or even circular to say that
structural argument does not appear outside constitutional
law—after all, the Constitution alone constitutes government.
It appears to be uniquely foundational in that way. Because
structural ways of talking trade on that feature, they are properly distinctive.
On reflection, however, the intuition turns out to be faulty.
Statutes, too, can constitute and regulate government institutions—including entities that are critically important for contemporary political, social, and economic life. A prime example
is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).145 That law, considered together with statutes that set up specific agencies, organizes public entities and determines how they may exercise
governmental power, including lawmaking, adjudication, and
enforcement. It therefore has been called a constitution for the
administrative state.146
141

Id.
Id. Think for instance of United States v. Nixon, where the Court roots its
holding on executive privilege virtually exclusively in structural concerns. 418
U.S. at 708 (noting that the “privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers”); see also BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 16, at 74–92 (citing cases).
143
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627–28.
144
Id. at 628.
145
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012).
146
See Bill Araiza, Regulatory Changes: Concluding Thoughts, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Dec. 6, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/12/
142
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Similarly, governments of U.S. territories are constituted
by statutes in a straightforward way. Congress exercises its
plenary power over federal entities to establish and structure
governments for territories such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, the
Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and so forth.147 These statutes function as constitutions—people commonly refer to
Guam’s “Bill of Rights,” for example148—but as a formal matter
they are ordinary congressional acts subject to ordinary
amendment by the vote of a simple majority.149
One might expect courts to interpret statutes that constitute government entities in this way by deploying structural
forms of argument. And sometimes, that does seem to happen.
A strong candidate is Heckler v. Chaney, where the Court held
that agency decisions about whether to enforce a statutory
command are presumptively unreviewable by courts.150 Much
of the opinion does turn on structural considerations. Justice
William Rehnquist offered three reasons for the holding: First,
agency decisions on enforcement often turn on special expertise, not only over the substantive issue but also over the extent
and best uses of the agency’s own resources. Second, an
agency decision to stay its hand does not usually involve the
coercive power over individuals’ rights that is the usual domain
of courts and, conversely, an agency decision to enforce will
provide a focus for court review of agency action. And third, an
agency’s enforcement decision bears some resemblance to a
decision by a prosecutor to pursue a criminal indictment,
something that has traditionally been left within the exclusive
regulatory-changes-concluding-thoughts.html [http://perma.cc/4WSC-5PCX]
(calling the APA “a skeletal constitution for the administrative state”); see also
Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law,
72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1986) (“My thesis is a simple one: the APA is more like a
constitution than a statute.”). The National Security Act may share similar features. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69–70 (1990) (arguing that the “national
security constitution” is comprised largely of framework statutes like the National
Security Act).
147
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (granting Congress the “Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States”); Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in
Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 680–82 (2013)
(explaining that although Congress retains plenary power over the territories,
since the 1950s Congress has authorized the territorial governments of Guam,
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Mariana Islands to
pass local laws).
148
See, e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1217 (9th Cir. 2002).
149
See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421a–b (2012).
150
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). We thank Hillel Levin for pointing us to this
case.
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province of the executive branch.151 Yet the Court does not let
these structural reasons stand alone. It concludes by saying
that the tradition of leaving enforcement decisions to agency
discretion is supported by such good reasons that the Court
does not believe that Congress intended to alter that
tradition.152
Ultimately, then, Heckler turns directly on an argument
about congressional intent and only indirectly on structural
reasoning. Providing a backstop in legislative intent seems to
be common in statutory interpretation. Yet it is missing from
constitutional argument, where structural reasoning can and
often does stand on its own. Perhaps that is why Heckler’s
structural argumentation—however provisional—is actually
quite unusual. More commonly, courts interpreting statutes,
including statutes that constitute governmental entities, base
their rulings exclusively or primarily on text and legislative
intent.153
It is possible that the structural reasoning in such cases is
actually driving the analysis, with the intent-based conclusion
added only to satisfy a formalistic notion that Congress’s will
must control the interpretation of statutes. But that possibility, even if correct, actually strengthens our point. The fact
that courts feel it necessary to anchor their reasoning in legislative intent marks a difference between constitutional and
statutory argument.154 Our sense is that, first, structural reasoning sometimes stands entirely alone in constitutional law in
a way that we believe it rarely does in statutory law and, second, invocations of constitutional text are oftentimes even more
151
Id. at 831–32. One commentator characterizes Heckler as a case that is
fundamentally about judicial deference to administrative decisions regarding resource allocation. See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008). That amounts to a more specific
structural argument but is entirely consistent with our general claim. Heckler is
discussed most often in connection with judicial review of agency inaction, a
question that is orthogonal to our point. See, e.g., Lisa S. Bressman, Judicial
Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657,
1664–75 (2004); see also Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 385–86 (2014).
152
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
153
For discussion of textualist interpretation of statutes, see supra notes
50–57 and accompanying text. For discussion of legislative intent-based interpretation of statutes, see supra notes 97–117 and accompanying text.
154
Of course, this sometimes happens in constitutional argument as well—
the Court will offer a textual hook for reasoning that is essentially structural. See
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 16, at 75 (noting cases in which a text is
offered, but where “structural argument is doing the real work of resolving the
issue”); id. at 84–85 (same). And to that degree, structural argument in the two
contexts may look similar.
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talismanic in constitutional cases concerning structure. Think
of the utterly inconsequential role of the text of the Tenth
Amendment in cases like National League of Cities v. Usery,155
or the fig-leaf functions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in decisions to incorporate the right to free speech
against the states.156 By contrast, even the leading cases for
structural understandings of statutes ultimately lean on congressional intent in a way that seems significant, if sometimes
formalistic.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the structural
reasoning in Heckler and similar cases is not mainly statutory
but instead it infers rules from constitutional structures. Although the opinion interprets a statute, the reasoning in Heckler actually concerns whether a decision regarding enforcement
should be taken by the executive branch—which includes the
agency—or by the courts.157 In other words, the case does not
involve a court making inferences about the meaning of a statute from the structures of government constituted by the statute. Ultimately, its inferences concern the Constitution itself,
and they therefore count as examples of familiar structuralism
in constitutional discourse, and not as an analogous form of
statutory argument.
Chevron is another prime example of the singularity of constitutional structuralism. There, the Court arguably grounded
its famous rule of deference to administrative agencies not by
inferring that rule from the structures that Congress had established but by reference to Congress’s intent to delegate gapfilling authority to the agency.158 Here, too, structural argu155
426 U.S. 833, 844–46, 851 (1976); see BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra
note 16, at 75 (offering the case as a paradigmatic example of structural
reasoning).
156
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 16, at 80 (endorsing Charles
Black’s structural understanding of incorporation in CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43 (1969)).
157
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (concluding that “an agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review”).
158
The Chevron Court focuses on Congress’s “express delegation” of interpretive power, not on an inference from administrative structures that Congress
erects:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.
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mentation about the basic architecture of the administrative
state does not seem to provide an independent way of talking.
Moreover, Chevron—like Heckler—arguably is at root an ordinary separation of powers case: it concerns whether executive
or judicial officials should have a particular power, namely the
ability to issue an authoritative reading of a statute.159
Another setting where you might expect to find structural
reasoning is where Congress sets out governance structures for
federal territories, as we have said. And it is possible to find
some talk of structure there—but it, too, turns out to be constitutional and not statutory.
In one illuminating case, the Guam Supreme Court had
interpreted the free exercise provision of the Guam Bill of
Rights to provide greater protection than what was afforded
under the parallel national constitutional provision.160 The
Ninth Circuit was tasked with deciding whether the territory’s
high court had the power to extend greater protection to citizens under the Guam religious liberty provision, in the way
that a state high court would have authority to interpret its
state constitution, or whether instead the Guam Supreme
Court had to adopt the meaning of the national Free Exercise
Clause as determined by Article III courts.161 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that because the Guam Bill of Rights was a federal
statute, it ultimately was subject to interpretation by national
courts.162 At first, its reasoning did not seem to turn on the
intent of Congress in passing the territorial free exercise provision. Instead, it held that
Guam is a federal instrumentality, enjoying only those rights
conferred to it by Congress, and its “Bill of Rights” is a federal
statute. Not even a sovereign State may interpret a federal
statute or constitutional provision in a way contrary to the
interpretation given it by the U.S. Supreme Court. We are
powerless to delegate authority to the Supreme Court of
Guam to interpret matters of federal law in a manner other
than that provided by the federal judiciary.163

This reasoning is identifiably structural—based neither on
text, nor on congressional intent, nor on precedent. Of course,
the court might have been unaware of the distinction and
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(footnote omitted).
159
Id.
160
Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002).
161
Id. at 1215.
162
Id. at 1215–16.
163
Id. at 1217.
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might, if pressed, have fallen back on an argument from intent,164 but that language is missing from the opinion. The
reasoning we have is structural.
On closer inspection, however, Guerrero could fairly be
read as an opinion about national governmental structures,
and therefore not an example of independent structural reasoning in statutory interpretation, but rather an instance of
structural reasoning in constitutional interpretation itself. After all, the decision seems to rest, ultimately, on an understanding of the federal judiciary and its relationship to both
Congress and the states, including state high courts and state
constitutions. If that is correct, then Guerrero does not provide
a clean example of structural reasoning in statutory
interpretation.
All of this brings us to the conclusion that structural arguments work differently in constitutional and statutory interpretation. Structural reasoning may play a role in statutory
interpretation, but usually one that is subordinate to intentbased argument, and usually with ultimate reference to constitutional structures themselves. In short, the distinctiveness of
constitutional structuralism reflects argumentative exceptionalism. It cannot be justified by an argument that only the
Constitution erects structures of government because statutes
sometimes do that as well.
Turning to the common law, no one ever thinks to make
structural arguments in ordinary legal practice, of course, and
that is our main point. No real analogue to structural argument in constitutional law really exists. It is not even clear
what would count as a structural argument in the context of
the common law. After all, the common law does not constitute
public institutions; it does not create the structures of government that then drive legal interpretation. The common law has
no role in that process.
But stepping back, the common law is often concerned
with its own structural question: whether to delegate decision
making to parties or to courts. And there, intriguingly, structural arguments do appear in common-law interpretation. This
is particularly clear in the choice between property and liability
164
For example, in a case cited by the Guerrero court, South Porto Rico Sugar
Co. v. Buscaglia, 154 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1946), the court came to the same result by
reference to congressional intent rather than structural considerations. Guerrero,
290 F.3d at 1217 (“When Congress by the [“Puerto Rico Bill of Rights”] enacted for
Puerto Rico provisions similar to those contained in our ‘Bill of Rights’ it intended
them to have the same purport as the like provisions of our Constitution.” (quoting Buscaglia, 154 F.2d at 100)).
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rules.165 When protecting legal entitlements, courts must
often choose between damages or injunctive relief. Traditionally, that choice was made formalistically and doctrinally.166
More recently, however, scholarship has reframed the decision
to focus on the relative strengths of courts versus private markets.167 Protecting legal entitlements through a damages remedy gives courts the power to value them, while protecting them
with a property rule allocates that authority to the parties
themselves. According to these accounts, the choice of remedy
should depend on the relative institutional advantages of
courts and private bargaining. Where transaction costs and
other market failures are likely to impede efficient bargaining
around a legal entitlement, courts should award damages
instead.168
It is not much of a stretch to analogize this reasoning to
structural arguments in constitutional law. Both focus on the
structural character of institutions—here, courts versus markets—and adopt legal rules consistent with those structures.
At least at a general level, choosing between property and liability rules amounts to a kind of structural choice that drives
common-law argument.
Despite this deep and quite surprising similarity, structural argument in constitutional law remains distinct. The relevant structures in the common law are not constituted by the
common law. And the significance of those institutions’ characteristics is not determined by the common law but only in
reference to some additional normative commitments—here, to
welfarist accounts that seek to maximize wellbeing by allocating resources to the parties that value them the most. In other
words, observations about the relative competence of markets
and courts rely at least implicitly on their effectiveness at
achieving an independent goal: allocating resources efficiently.
Structural argument in constitutional law is freestanding and
165
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
166
See, e.g., Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (balancing equities to choose between injunctive relief or damages).
167
Modern scholarship reframing the question in terms of institutional competence includes, for example, Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 165, at 1110.
See also Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 78 (1997) (“When markets can price goods at
lower transaction costs than courts, prohibitions provide a more efficient structure for transactions than liability.”).
168
This is a straightforward application of the Coase Theorem, which posits
that in the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain to the efficient outcome. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8, 15 (1960).
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need not depend on independent commitments outside the
structure of the Constitution itself.
It is fascinating to find a resemblance to structural argument in the common law, but the resemblance does not ultimately undermine our central claim that structural reasoning
in the constitutional sense remains unique. We will spell out
the implications of this discovery in Part II, when we consider
possible justifications for the distinctiveness that we see in
constitutional discourse.
D. Precedent
The role of precedent in interpreting different sources of
law is at once more straightforward and more slippery. It is
straightforward because the differences are relatively well documented. It is slippery because the role of precedent remains
an ongoing source of high-stakes controversy.
There can be no real dispute that constitutional and statutory interpretation evolve analogously to the common law,
through the ongoing process of judicial interpretation. The law
is thought to be like a kind of palimpsest, where the underlying
text is painted over with layer upon layer of subsequent interpretation, each of which must be examined to see the complete
picture.169
Given most people’s sense that the Constitution is especially entrenching, it is perhaps surprising that precedent in
constitutional interpretation is singularly weak.170 At least as
a descriptive matter, predicting the application of a constitutional rule requires consulting the constitutional text, but
also—and even more importantly—those Supreme Court cases
interpreting the constitutional text—the added layers of judicial gloss. The full entrenching power of the Constitution,
then, depends on how binding those judicial decisions are on
future courts. And here there is a relatively clear hierarchy in
the force of precedent in legal interpretation, with constitutional precedent at the bottom. As one commentator recently
summarized: “Cases interpreting statutes . . . receive strongerthan-normal stare decisis effect. Cases interpreting the
169
Richard Fallon refers to the combination of constitutional text and stare
decisis as “constitutional practice.” See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional
Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1107, 1118–20 (2008).
170
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of
Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399, 399 (2008) (“When
we ask what the Constitution is, . . . Americans tend to focus exclusively on
entrenchment.”).
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Constitution, by contrast, receive weaker-than-normal stare
decisis effect. . . . The baseline of normal stare decisis effect is
apparently reserved for cases developing the federal common
law.”171 This is particularly true of the Supreme Court itself
but it also captures practices among lower courts.172 The rationale for strong stare decisis in the context of statutory interpretation is the ability of Congress to overturn the Court’s
decision through statutory amendment. Congressional silence
therefore can count as a form of acquiescence.173 The fact that
the Constitution is so difficult to amend means, under this
reasoning, that courts should be—and in fact are—more willing to reverse course when they decide that a prior interpretation was wrong.174
Today, however, there is significant disagreement over the
appropriate role of precedent in constitutional interpretation.
A number of theorists—primarily originalists—have argued
that precedent should have no role in constitutional interpretation.175 If the text of the Constitution—interpreted “properly”
through recourse to original meaning—compels an outcome in
a particular case, then the existence of intervening precedent
should be irrelevant.176 In characterizing the argument, Professor Fallon writes: “When one casts off the blinkers and
171
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 321 (2005). Barrett argues that lower courts, like the
Supreme Court, have embraced the rule that super-strong precedential effect
attaches to interpretations of statutes. Id. at 318, 327–28; see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1867 (2008). The observation was articulated most
powerfully in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).
172
See Barrett, supra note 171, at 327–28 (arguing that lower courts, like the
Supreme Court, have embraced the rule of heightened precedential effect for
interpretations of statutes); Widiss, supra note 81, at 870–71 & n.45 (describing
both empirical studies and doctrine supporting the super-strong statutory precedent rule among lower courts as well as the Supreme Court).
173
See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 21, at 229 (“In the statutory area,
following precedent is not terribly problematic given the ability of the legislature to
overturn mistaken judicial precedents through ordinary legislation.”); Barrett,
supra note 171, at 322 (same). Barrett also identifies a related justification based
on separation of powers principles that can be set aside here. Id. at 323.
174
The Supreme Court has overturned previous constitutional decisions on
numerous occasions. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 60 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
175
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24 (1994).
176
See, e.g., Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (“Stare decisis presents problems for textualist jurists
because it allows the Supreme Court to apply its precedents as rules of decision
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thinks hard, how could adherence to judicial precedents that
deviate from the supreme law possibly be anything other than
treason to the Constitution?”177 Recognizing how far the results of this reasoning deviate from normal and accepted constitutional practice, a number of theorists have sought to
justify stare decisis on other grounds.178 Others have taken
the deviation as grounds to reject the argument outright.179
But there remains a live controversy whether precedent has
any place in constitutional interpretation.
On the other hand, David Strauss has fully embraced the
role of precedent in constitutional law. He argues that evolution through the common-law process provides a principled
way of mediating between the competing pressures of entrenchment and evolution, and so provides real legitimacy for
constitutional interpretation.180
We need take no stand on this long-simmering controversy. In fact, the very existence of the controversy reinforces
our observation that precedent operates uniquely in the constitutional context. There is no similar hand wringing around the
use of precedent for statutory interpretation, even if a subsequent court thinks that the earlier court misinterpreted the law
or that conditions have subsequently changed. One needs to
look no further than the odd baseball exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act to see the role of statutory precedent in
action.181 And, of course, no one would consider objecting to
the role of precedent in the evolution of the common law, where
precedent is the common law. Precedent is least important in
constitutional interpretation.
E. Metainterpretation
So far, we have examined how particular types of interpretive arguments work differently in constitutional interpretaeven when they deviate from proper textualist interpretations of the
Constitution.”).
177
Fallon, supra note 169, at 1110.
178
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 176, at 11 (arguing that stare decisis allows
the Court to avoid decision costs of revisiting previously decided questions); Lee J.
Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1731 (2010) (noting that by relying on originalist
precedent, judges can avoid reevaluating every constitutional issue).
179
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 169, at 1118.
180
See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 879 (1996).
181
This is a common example. See Barrett, supra note 171, at 319 & n.5
(citing Thomas Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era
to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 731 (1999)).
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tion. In this subpart, we ask a metaquestion: What happens
when recognized types of arguments point in different directions? What if, for example, the plain meaning of the text contradicts the intent of the lawmaker or the purpose of the law?
Are there rules capable of resolving such conflicts? And do any
such rules in constitutional law differ from those in statutory
and common-law argumentation?
Our argument in this subpart will be that although similar
answers to these questions are present in both constitutional
and other practice settings, the predominant approaches actually differ discernibly. Courts and lawyers performing statutory interpretation conventionally look to the text in
combination with the law’s purpose, which can be defined and
detected in various ways. In constitutional law, by contrast,
this text-plus-purpose approach is not dominant. Rather, lawyers consult the full range of authoritative guides to interpretation, including precedent, structure, ethos, and prudence in
addition to text and purpose or history. There is a question
about how to resolve conflicts among these sources, but referring to text and purpose alone is not the prevalent answer.
Before laying out that argument step by step, we want to
acknowledge that most often the metaquestion does not present itself. Richard Fallon, writing in the constitutional context, argued in a classic paper that interpretive arguments
usually converge, probably because they allow for enough leeway for a lawyer or judge to argue persuasively that they point
in the same direction.182 This is an observable feature of legal
practice.
However, even if convergence is the general rule on the
ground, divergence does occur on the edges, and there some
method of choosing among interpretive arguments must be
found. One conceptual possibility is singularism, which privileges one interpretive approach over all others. Originalism is
perhaps the best-known example—it excludes or subordinates
interpretive considerations other than historical intent or
meaning.183 John Hart Ely’s representation reinforcement the182

Fallon, supra note 18, at 1189.
Scalia’s originalism is “faint-hearted” precisely insofar as it recognizes
other sorts of arguments as persuasive, at least some of the time. Solow & Friedman, supra note 110, at 71. And an important recent strain of originalism is
singularist only with regard to “interpretation,” meaning the semantic content of
the text, but is more open when it comes to “construction,” meaning the implementation of that text in the context of actual legal disputes. Solum, supra note
76, at 95–96.
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ory has been called an instance of singularism.184 Nicholas
Rosenkranz’s theory is perhaps another, grounded as it is in
textual considerations that trump other arguments, such as
those from structure and precedent.185
Although constitutional singularism is available as a conceptual matter, it is not customary in legal practice, where
interpretive pluralism prevails instead. Nonoriginalism claims
as a great strength that it better matches existing constitutional culture, in which arguments from text, structure, history, and so forth coexist and count as persuasive.186 Bobbitt
and Fallon have offered classic descriptions of that pluralist
culture.187 Proposals to manage the diverse forms of interpretation that we see in practice range from Jack Balkin’s living
originalism188 to Strauss’s common-law constitutionalism,189
to Robert Post and Reva Siegel’s democratic constitutionalism190 and beyond.191
Pluralistic perspectives on constitutional interpretation all
must show how conflicts among interpretive authorities should
be resolved.192 Fallon believes that in practice legal actors reg184
See Fallon, supra note 18, at 1209 (claiming that Ely’s theory fits within
the rubric of interpretivism, which privileges only “arguments from text and the
intent of the framers”).
185
See Rosenkranz, supra note 43, at 1210. It is striking that Rosenkranz
offers no argument for privileging his brand of textualism over any of its rivals.
186
But see Baude, supra note 3, at 2369 (arguing that the law does in fact
prioritize originalism and that other modes of interpretation are only law insofar
as they are rooted in original meaning).
187
Barry Friedman and Sara Solow recently have endorsed the view that
interpreting the Constitution according to text, history, structure, precedent, and
other factors is customary among lawyers and judges. Solow & Friedman, supra
note 110, at 76. Solow and Friedman call this method of interpreting the
Constitution “ordinary constitutional interpretation” and argue that it characterizes customary practice among lawyers and judges. Id. at 70; see also Wilson R.
Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 GONZ. L. REV.
433, 436 (2001) (describing pluralism in constitutional interpretation).
188
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 341–42 n.2 (2011) (endorsing and adapting Bobbitt’s account of the modalities of constitutional interpretation).
189
Strauss, supra note 180.
190
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
191
Primus, supra note 100, at 175, 183–84 (adapting Bobbitt’s modalities to a
“toolkit” approach that asks when each one is appropriate).
192
In fact, very few constitutional theorists contest this descriptive claim—
abstracting from actual practices yields interpretive pluralism. See Fallon, supra
note 18, at 1189 (“With only a few dissenters, most judges, lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance of at least five kinds of constitutional argument . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Disagreement springs up when people consider
the further question of whether the actual use of these types implies their legitimacy. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 100, at 183 (disagreeing with Bobbitt’s legitimacy claim).
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ularly—and properly—prioritize arguments according to an implicit hierarchy of constitutional authority.193 Text is regarded
as most authoritative, followed by history, structure, precedent, and so forth in rank order.194 Others, such as Bobbitt
and Post, question the existence of an implicit hierarchy. They
point to cases in which courts have disregarded that ordering—
without any weakening of persuasiveness or legitimacy. For
them, prioritizing interpretive moves will be a matter of “judgment” (Post’s term) or “conscience” (Bobbitt’s).195 These are
descriptive claims as well as normative ones. Bobbitt and Post
believe that legal actors select among competing interpretive
arguments, both actually and appropriately.196
How does this situation compare to legal practice and theory in the context of statutory interpretation? There, too,
singularism is sometimes promoted as a normative matter. Legal actors have promoted theories that privilege text,197 subjective legislative intent,198 purpose,199 or contemporary public
meaning.200
Yet it is widely recognized, as it is in constitutional interpretation, that multiple interpretive arguments carry authority
on the ground. According to Eskridge, for example, several
sources legitimately bear on statutory interpretation, and they
are organized into a hierarchy that ranges from the most authoritative and concrete to the least authoritative and most
abstract. Those sources include statutory text, specific and
general legislative history, legislative purpose, evolution of the
statute, and current policy (sometimes also called pragmatism).201 Eskridge’s theory of dynamic statutory interpretation
urges legal actors to embrace this pluralism and to recognize
that the interplay of arguments and institutions can result in a
193

Fallon, supra note 18, at 1194.
Id.
195
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 16, at 168; Post, supra note 19, at
35; see also Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1753, 1765 (1994) (describing Post and Bobbitt’s theories of constitutional
interpretation).
196
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 16, at 94; Post, supra note 19, at
26–27.
197
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 69 (1994).
198
See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419,
419 (2005) (describing the dominance of intentionalism among judges).
199
See Levin, supra note 133, at 1110 (describing purposivism).
200
See, e.g., id. at 1105 (advocating a “contemporary meaning and expectations approach”).
201
See Stack, supra note 15, at 15 (discussing ESKRIDGE, supra note 71, at 56,
and Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 31, at 353).
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system of statutory interpretation that is both democratically
responsive and stable over time.202
In sum, both statutory interpretation and constitutional
interpretation feature a pluralistic practice, accompanied by
theories that either embrace that complexity or resist it in favor
of a singularism that promises greater determinacy.
So far, the structures of legal discourse in the two domains
seem to parallel each other. Yet it is our contention that they
actually diverge in fascinating ways. Consider first that although singularists are active in both settings, some of the very
same people who promote one source of authority in constitutional interpretation advocate for something different when it
comes to statutory law. For example, Justice Scalia, as we
have already described, prefers to resolve problems of constitutional understanding by reference to original meaning. And he
explicitly promotes a similar approach to statutory law.203 Yet
he practices a purer form of textualism when it comes to statutory law—one that ignores legislative history as part of the
relevant historical context for arriving at original meaning, even
though he is happy to refer to the writings of Madison or Hamilton in constitutional cases, if only to support original meaning,
ostensibly.204
Turning to the more prevalent practice of pluralism, it is
revealing to ask which methodology is dominant in each setting, rather than whether it operates at all within the set of
accepted arguments. To take that approach is to ask not about
the scope of each discourse—whether, say, intentionalism is
included within the set of accepted moves in both areas, a
question that would yield answers that would be clear but not
particularly illuminating—but rather to ask about the shape of
each discourse—how persuasive a way of arguing is seen to be
in that domain. To adopt this perspective is to focus on the
prevalence and persistence of an argument, in other words,
rather than simply on whether it ever appears as acceptable.

202

See id. at 18.
“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute:
the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”
Scalia, supra note 31, at 38.
204
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 71, at 34, 230–34 (claiming that for textualists
like Scalia and Easterbrook, “the beginning, and usually the end, of statutory
interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the statutory language”); Gluck,
supra note 69, at 1762 (noting that textualism is “associated most closely with
Justice Scalia’s legisprudence”); Levin, supra note 133, at 1110 (calling Scalia
“the judicial avatar of textualism”).
203
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From that perspective, it is fair to say that nonoriginalism
prevails in actual constitutional interpretation, both on the
Court and among other legal actors. This is so even if “living
constitutionalism” represents a minority strain within constitutional scholarship. Stepping back and characterizing the
way that lawyers actually work, text, structure, and history all
matter in constitutional interpretation, and meanings in fact
are understood to shift over time in response to social and
political forces as well as institutional dynamics. Pure forms of
textualism and originalism, on the other hand, are rarely
seen.205 This is a conventional account of positive law, even if
its desirability is the subject of impassioned scholarly
disagreements.
In statutory interpretation, by contrast, arguments from
text and purpose predominate.206 Lawyers conventionally consult the text of a provision first, along with its place within the
statute’s broader textual architecture. If ambiguity remains,
they look to the statute’s purpose.207 This practice does not
amount to pure textualism, which allows other sources to be
considered only if the words are ambiguous. However, the text
does enjoy some authoritative priority for lawyers, followed by
(or along with) its legislative purpose. We think this is true
even though there is considerable debate over what should
count as legislative purpose and what evidence should be probative of that purpose.208 Candidates include legislative intent
evidenced by legislative history, objective intent perhaps supported by extrinsic historical evidence of social meanings, purpose in the sense of Hart and Sacks’s legal process theory, and
so forth. Prior decisions have particularly strong force in the
statutory field, but only with regard to particular language once

205
See Solow & Friedman, supra note 110, at 75–77 (arguing that the Heller
decision, although the best available example of originalism in the Supreme
Court, actually employs the full range of constitutional arguments).
206
For empirical support, see supra text accompanying notes 42–49.
207
See Gluck, supra note 69 (describing a common practice of “modified textualism” among state high courts); see also id. at 1830 (“[M]ost judges now agree
that text trumps nearly all of the time . . . .”). On the movement among Supreme
Court Justices away from legislative history and toward text, see Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 66; Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance
on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
369, 386 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 354, 357, 373 (1994).
208
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 71, at 25–28 (noting that because “[s]ome statutes are little else but back-room deals,” “actual or even conventional” legislative
purpose is difficult to recover).
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it has been construed, and not with regard to interpretive
methodology.209
To see this point even more clearly, consider the relationship of Eskridge’s dynamic statutory interpretation to mainstream argument. That theory is countercultural, as Eskridge
himself acknowledges. His contention that statutory interpretation should more closely mirror actual constitutional interpretation has critical punch precisely because (or to the degree
that) the culture of statutory interpretation has developed differently.210 Formalistic appeals to text and purpose are more
common in statutory contexts than are pluralistic appeals that
privilege institutional dialogue and shifting democratic dynamics.211 Eskridge recognizes the relative rigidity of statutory interpretation when he says “[n]either constitutional nor
common law interpretation is viewed as just an exercise in
discovering original intent” and when he asks “[w]hy should
statutory interpretation, our third main source of law, be conceptualized as an originalist enterprise?”212
Admittedly, Eskridge defends his theory partly as a positive
account of the actual operation of interbranch dialogue over
statutes.213 Even if he is correct about that, however, the fact
remains that mainstream lawyers do not understand themselves to be engaging in dynamic statutory interpretation, and
consequently they do not articulate their approach to statutory
interpretation that way.214 Rather, they see themselves as
carefully applying the dominant text-plus-purpose interpretive
methodology.
No mainstream lawyer would perceive the practice of constitutional law that way. There, although the wording of the
text is important, it arguably matters less than it does elsewhere in law, as we have said.215 Moreover, although purpose
is almost universally regarded as relevant to constitutional de209
See supra subpart I.D (discussing precedent); see also Gluck, supra note
69, at 1766 (noting that interpretations of statutory language enjoy “super strong”
precedential effect, but that the Supreme Court does not give prior methodological
choices any deference).
210
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 71, at 2 (noting that statutory interpretation has
a “more distinguished intellectual history” than constitutional interpretation).
211
See id. at 9.
212
Id. at 6.
213
See id.
214
See id. at 9 (noting that “the ‘original intent’ and ‘plain meaning’ rhetoric of
American statutory interpretation scholarship and decisions treats statutes as
static texts and assumes that the meaning of a statute is fixed from the date of
enactment” and contrasting dynamic statutory interpretation to that rhetoric).
215
See supra subpart I.A.
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cision making, it does not play the dominant role that it does in
legislative doctrine. Everyone understands that the role of original intent or meaning is controversial in interpretation of the
Commerce Clause or the First Amendment.216 Constitutional
politics, relatedly, play a much more open and accepted role in
constitutional interpretation than do statutory politics in litigation over legislation.
Common-law interpretation is also less pluralist in practice than constitutional interpretation. There is, in fact, a trivial sense in which common-law interpretation is uniquely
singular in its interpretive methodology: it discerns legal rules
from the outcome in earlier cases.217 But as any lawyer knows,
the process of common-law reasoning involves analogizing and
distinguishing those prior decisions, and it is in that interpretive act that pluralism again appears.218 What makes another
case an appropriate analogue? What are appropriate bases for
distinguishing precedent?219
Common-law reasoning relies upon explicit or, often, implicit claims about the purpose of the common-law rule at issue. This means focusing sometimes on its formalistic
doctrinal contours, its moral underpinnings, its consequential
benefits, or other normative commitments.220 These different
considerations are not mutually exclusive, and legal reasoning
often encompasses more than one. It may start, for example,
with the historical evolution of a doctrine, before turning to the
equity and potential consequences of a rule’s application. Ulti216
See, e.g., Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens United,
15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765, 784 (2013) (noting that scholars have criticized the
Court’s invocation of originalism to support the Citizens United decision).
217
See generally ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 21, at 64 (“Texts on judicial reasoning, as well as judges themselves, often maintain that the primary
decision-making method of the common law is reasoning by analogy.”); LLOYD L.
WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (explaining
the process of analogical reasoning).
218
This account of the singularism of common-law interpretation is also too
parsimonious. A number of scholars have identified a breadth of interpretive
moves in standard common-law reasoning. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 93, at
39, 71, 86; Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996);
Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an
Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 64 (1985); see also ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 21, at 31 (“[T]here are two plausible models of common-law reasoning, and only two.”).
219
See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 21, at 68–69 (“To reason that [two
cases] should be decided alike, [one] must determine that they are importantly
similar, and to reason that they are importantly similar, [one] must refer to some
general proposition that links [the facts or contexts together].”).
220
See id. at 70–71.
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mately, then, singularism dominates the overall form of common-law interpretation, but its application tends towards
pluralism.
In sum, constitutional argument is distinctive not only
within each form of interpretive argument or source of authority but also on a higher level of abstraction, with regard to
overarching approaches to managing these forms and sources.
Most importantly, pluralism tends to look different in different
legal settings, with constitutional lawyers practicing it rather
freely, statutory lawyers looking more restrictively to statutory
text supplemented by legislative purpose, and common-law
lawyers adopting pluralistic methods in marshaling relevant
precedent. Although these are differences of emphasis rather
than inclusion or exclusion, they separate different legal discourses in discernible ways.
II
JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Is there something about the Constitution that could make
sense of the extraordinary interpretive forms that we have been
describing? Does it have characteristics or claims to authority
that make it so different from statutes or the common law that
it should have a special legal discourse with its own accepted
moves?
To most lawyers, the answer seems obvious. Of course the
Constitution is different—it is unique, in fact. Only one law is
supreme in the sense that it trumps all others, only one law is
as difficult to amend and thus has persisted as consistently
over time, only one law enjoys an extraordinary democratic
mandate, only one law is written in such lofty and abstract
terms that express principled commitments, and only one law
was drafted by prominent figures from American history like
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. That a document
with these characteristics should draw its own methods of interpretation is thought to be commonsensical.
Yet once those assumptions are interrogated, questions begin to arise. Is the Constitution really the only law that is
entrenched against meaningful change in our system? Does it
really enjoy democratic legitimacy not bestowed on other laws?
Is no other law written in abstract terms that express deep
commitments of principle? And even if the Constitution is
alone in its supremacy, does that status justify the interpretive
moves that lawyers apply to that law and no other?
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Thinking clearly about these questions requires examining
the relationships between constitutional attributes, authority,
and argument. Some attributes that set the Constitution apart
may not contribute convincingly to its authority. That the document is written in abstract terms, for instance, may not lend it
additional weight. And the fact that the law is supreme in its
legal authority may not provide a reason why it should be subject to different forms of argument.221 Relationships between
these concepts are looser than even astute lawyers customarily
appreciate.
Paying attention to these distinctions, among others, we
argue below that the justifications for constitutional specialization in legal argument are less forceful than most people commonly assume. The Constitution has a number of attributes
that might seem to justify interpretive exceptionalism. Again,
these include its form and subject matter, its entrenchment, its
supremacy, and its perfection. In fact, however, those attributes do not set the Constitution apart from other sources of law
both because they exist elsewhere and because they do not
characterize the Constitution itself as much as people think.
The Constitution also has unique-seeming claims to authority rooted in its democratic legitimacy and its status in
legal culture. The former is again unpersuasive as a description of the Constitution’s authority. Only the latter turns out to
hold up to close scrutiny, but it is oddly circular. The
Constitution is exalted because people believe it to be—because it occupies a lofty place in the American cultural imagination. Even that attribute, while it does distinguish the
Constitution, may have trouble justifying the special forms of
interpretive argument that we see in legal practice.
The distinction between constitutional attributes and constitutional authority is admittedly porous. Supremacy, for example, is an attribute of the Constitution. But supremacy may
also be a source of the Constitution’s authority; its status requires fealty in ways that are distinct from other sources of law
and in ways that affect interpretive choices. Ultimately, our
analysis does not depend on distinguishing cleanly between
attributes and sources of authority. The goal is to examine the
221
See Samaha, supra note 99 (interrogating the relationships between constitutional authority and argument). But see Joseph Raz, On the Authority and
Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 153, 157 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (“[T]he principles of
constitutional interpretation depend in part on the theory of constitutional
authority.”).
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various possible justifications for interpretive exceptionalism,
whatever their character. When, for example, we reject
supremacy as a reason for interpreting the Constitution differently from other sources of law, we do so regardless of whether
it is viewed as a constitutional attribute or a source of constitutional authority. Nevertheless, the distinction between attributes and authority provides a useful conceptual frame for
considering (and questioning) different reasons for treating the
Constitution as special.
A. Form and Subject Matter
The most obvious constitutional attribute is also the easiest to reject as a justification for interpretive exceptionalism,
and that is its form and specific content. As Chief Justice
Marshall observed, the Constitution is distinct because it does
not have the “prolixity of a legal code.”222 It speaks in broad
terms, invoking general principles like “[f]ull faith and
credit,”223 “necessary and proper,”224 “cruel and unusual punishment[ ],”225 “equal protection,”226 and “due process of
law.”227 It might then seem that the interpretive methodology
should be different for the Constitution because it takes a different form.
In fact, however, the Constitution is less distinct than casual observers might think. For one thing, many constitutional
provisions do, in fact, exhibit legal prolixity.228 While the most
familiar provisions are couched in broad terms, much of the
Constitution is detailed and mechanical. And, conversely,
much ordinary statutory law is itself written broadly and lacks
the wordiness of other legal codes. The Sherman Act, for example, provides: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
222
Chief Justice Marshall’s famous admonition is preceded by an explanation
that a constitution cannot have “the prolixity of a legal code” and be understood
by the public. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
223
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
224
Id. art. I, § 8.
225
Id. amend. VIII.
226
Id. amend. XIV.
227
Id. amend. V, XIV.
228
See, e.g., id. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall
return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider
it.”).
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be illegal.”229 The Act does not define “restraint of trade” and it
offers no more textual guidance than constitutional phrases
like “equal protection” and “due process of law.” Other statutes
are similar.230 Congress often delegates authority to administrative agencies by writing broadly.
The bottom line: some constitutional provisions have the
detail of a legal code, and some codes the generality of a constitution. It is therefore difficult to justify a practice of interpretation that treats constitutional interpretation as categorically
different.231 Can anyone imagine the Sherman Antitrust Act
being interpreted like the Constitution—with reverential deference to its framers, for instance?
Perhaps, though, it is not the form but the subject matter
of constitutional provisions that sets them apart. Equal protection, due process, citizenship, and the like are aspirational
concepts. They are meant as evocative guides more than technical rules. But this claim, too, does not hold up to scrutiny for
precisely the same set of reasons. While some of the
Constitution’s most powerful protections have this kind of aspirational quality, much of the rest of the document plays in a
more mundane field.232 More importantly, the Constitution
does not have a monopoly on aspirational provisions. Many
congressional statutes address similar concepts, and even provide broader and more powerful protection than the Constitution itself.233
In sum, while some constitutional provisions are expressed
differently from many statutes, and address bigger or at least
229

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (defining “mail fraud” to include a
“scheme or artifice to defraud”); id. § 1346 (2012) (extending mail fraud statute to
conduct depriving another of “the intangible right of honest services”); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 5 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court
has called the Sherman Act a “common-law statute” because of its open-ended
language (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899
(2007)); Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251,
253–63 (2010) (discussing the interpretive challenge of vague federal criminal law
statutes); John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 260–65 (2002) (same).
231
It is partly for this reason that Richard Primus argues for differentiating
between provisions in the Constitution and not treating them all as equally constitutional. See Primus, supra note 13.
232
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“[N]either shall any person be eligible to [be
President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . . .”).
233
See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012) (prohibiting de
facto discrimination in housing, whereas the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
only de jure discrimination); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015) (affirming
that FHA prohibits discriminatory impacts).
230
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more aspirational concepts than much statutory law, these do
not justify categorically different approaches to constitutional
interpretation. Not all constitutional provisions have the character of the Equal Protection Clause, for example, and some
statutes do.
B. Entrenchment
Another obvious-seeming justification for the
Constitution’s interpretive exceptionalism is its entrenching
quality—that is, its ability to bind the future and its relative
insusceptibility to change through the normal majoritarian political process. While people have long debated the desirability
of entrenchment, few dispute that the Constitution’s commands carry weight into the future like no other source of
law.234 But they should. More considered reflection quickly
reveals both that other acts of government can be extremely
entrenching and that the Constitution itself is surprisingly
amenable to change.
Under one traditional view, entrenchment is a binary status that, when attached to ordinary law, renders the law invalid. It is a core principle of democracy that one legislature
cannot make policy choices binding on a future legislature. An
attempt to do so is entrenching and therefore impermissible,
and a subsequent legislature can avoid enforcement of the earlier government’s decision.235 Under this view, the
Constitution is not just different; it is unique. It is the only law
that is permissibly entrenched against future change by ordinary means.
In fact, however, this binary view of entrenchment misapprehends legal commitments in the real world. As one of us
has argued, entrenchment exists on a spectrum, and many
activities a government routinely undertakes can entrench policy choices into the future.236 A government that enters into a
long-term lease or procurement contract, grants a franchise, or
settles litigation through a consent decree will create binding
legal obligations in the future.237 Likewise, a government that
234
See, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 10–11 (2001); Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1329, 1331 n.3 (2010) (citing sources); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1934) (describing “highly
probable permanence” as the sine qua non of constitutionality).
235
See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 465
(1837).
236
See Serkin, supra note 6.
237
See id. at 892–96.
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conveys away conservation easements, incurs debt, or alienates important assets will constrain the policy choices available
to future legislatures.238 These commitments, admittedly, do
not all look like “law.” Nevertheless, as a preliminary matter,
these categories of government action demonstrate the breadth
of entrenching decisions governments can make.
There are, however, other more subtly entrenching forces
that can convert “ordinary” law into all-but-immutable policy
choices. Indeed, an ordinary law can also become entrenched
simply through the passage of time. The Judiciary Act of 1789
is a statute as amenable to change as any law, but only in
theory. In reality, the law has become such an important
strand in the warp of our political system that it, too, is all but
immune from normal democratic change.239 Nor do laws need
to be of such ancient vintage to have that effect. The Sherman
Antitrust Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Administrative Procedure Act are also here to stay. Admittedly, not every
law becomes entrenched simply through the passage of time or
the accretion of habit. Some, instead, become out of date.
Others never really take hold in the same way as these examples. But that does not change our underlying and ultimately
modest claim that the Constitution is not uniquely entrenched.
Path dependence is a distinct but related dynamic by
which laws that establish, for example, important bureaucratic
institutions become difficult to change because of vested interests and administrative inertia.240 Or, more generally, a law
can also be politically entrenched if it creates enduring special
interest groups with a significant vested stake in the law’s preservation.241 An obvious example is rent regulation in New York
City. Tenants in rent-controlled apartments have a tremendous financial incentive to preserve the legal status quo. Those
high per capita financial stakes, coupled with the organiza238
For a discussion of conservation easements, see Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private Conservation Easements over Public Land, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 342 (2010).
239
See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789,
and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1479 (noting the
“remarkable strength and durability of the Judiciary Act of 1789”).
240
See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 332, 332 (1985) (defining path dependence as a characteristic of economic
change according to which “important influences upon the eventual outcome can
be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by
chance elements rather than systematic forces” and applying the concept to entrenchment of the QWERTY keyboard).
241
See Daryl J. Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and
Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 413–23 (2015) (describing the process by which
laws become politically entrenched).
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tional advantages that come with relatively small special interest groups, make rent control a kind of third rail in New York
City politics.242 Even though economists have roundly criticized rent regulation’s distorting effects on the New York City
housing market,243 and even though it is perennially under
attack,244 rent control is not going anywhere. Importantly,
those political dynamics are a byproduct of the law itself, which
created valuable vested interests. There are numerous examples at the federal level as well, where the political dynamics
created by a law or regulatory regime make the law extremely
resistant to change.245
Moreover, for all the talk by courts and commentators that
statutory interpretation is backstopped by the legislature’s
power to change the law, Congress in fact seldom takes up the
gauntlets that courts frequently throw down. Congress itself is
not purely majoritarian. Filibuster rules in the Senate, together with the more general dynamics of bicameralism, mean
that supermajorities are often required for most “ordinary” legislative change.246 At the very least, Congress is not in the
habit of taking up minor course corrections, and even unexpectedly major changes in courts’ interpretation of a given law
will not regularly trigger a congressional response. The supposed flexibility in statutory law is often theoretical only. Statutory practice, in the real world, gives interpreters great
latitude to shape laws’ application without meaningful congressional oversight. The notional ability of Congress to
change the underlying statute in the face of an objectionable
interpretation is therefore less important in reality than people
often claim.
The story with common-law doctrines is somewhat more
complicated because many are subject to legislative override
242
See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 61 (2001) (describing attributes of special interest group
power). The actual political dynamics in New York are complicated because landlords would seem to have similar characteristics. Nevertheless, there is no doubt
that rent regulations remain firmly entrenched.
243
See Adam Davidson, The Illusion of Control, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 28, 2013,
at 14–15.
244
See Manny Fernandez, In a Campaign to Raise Rents, an Attempt to Humanize Landlords, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A22.
245
Grazing rights are a good example. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 762 n.191
(1993) (“President Clinton . . . learned the difficulty of abolishing the undermarket aspect of the grazing program, when political pressure forced him to
withdraw his proposal to raise the fees under the program to market values.”).
246
The debates over health care demonstrate that both sides view any resulting legislation as very difficult to change again in the future.
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through the normal political process. From the abolition of the
fee tail in the 1790s to the statutory repeal of the rule against
perpetuities in some states,247 even long-standing rules are
subject to change through ordinary legislation. But not all are.
The best-known example is the public trust doctrine. Property
held in trust for the public—traditionally, submerged lands,
but today other property as well248—cannot be alienated or
otherwise encumbered, even through the normal democratic
process. If a legislature tries to sell off such land, a subsequent
legislature can have the sale undone.249
The public trust doctrine is admittedly unusual in this
regard but other common-law doctrines are entrenched for the
same reason as some statutory law: they have become too
much a part of our common-law culture to change. Specific
performance for land sale contracts or bona fide purchaser
protection in contracts are effectively permanent. Of course,
there can be lots of play in the joints of even core common-law
doctrines. Privity of contract has been extended dramatically
over the last fifty years, as have concepts of duty and proximate
cause.250 Indeed, it is in its very nature that the whole of the
common law bends and shifts over time. This flexibility is
thought to be its greatest strength. But all those changes
should not disguise the equally significant truth that core aspects of each of these doctrines will not change easily or soon.
While exceptions may arise to property’s traditional right to
exclude, the basic concept of trespass is firmly embedded in
our legal and political culture.251
247
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (2014) (statutory repeal of rule against
perpetuities in Delaware); Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1977) (“South
Carolina and Delaware had abolished entail in 1776, and by the end of the
eighteenth century virtually all of the new American states had eliminated [the fee
tail] . . . .”); see also Claire Priest, The End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and
Slavery in the American Revolutionary Period, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 305–07
(2015) (describing the abolition of the fee tail).
248
See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16
PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7–14 (2007).
249
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892) (describing
and applying the public trust doctrine).
250
See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty
Law in Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1890 (2011) (noting that most courts
have rejected Cardozo’s relational view of duty).
251
Nor is protection against change limited only to political will or legal tradition. Today, federal courts may even police the ability of state courts to change
state common law too dramatically. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 721 (2010); see also Frederic Bloom &
Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 568–75 (2012).
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Again, the argument here is not that the entirety of the
common law is entrenched against change in the same way as
the Constitution but simply that aspects of the common law
are similarly immune to change. There is, in other words, no
in-kind difference in the entrenching character of the
Constitution from other sources of law.
Just as importantly, the Constitution itself is less entrenched than people commonly assume. Of course, the
Constitution can, in fact, be amended, and has been seventeen
times since the initial ten amendments in the Bill of Rights.252
But the most significant source of legal change comes through
the practice of constitutional law more generally. Whether it is
constitutional protection for same-sex marriage, property
rights, criminal defendants’ rights, or states’ rights, the meaning of constitutional provisions is constantly changing, and
sometimes quite dramatically. Certainly, Article V amendment
is not always necessary, even for rules that once were thought
to require formal amendment to be changed.253
Nor are interpretive changes independent of the normal
political process, at least when broadly construed. Popular
constitutionalism recognizes that courts—even the Supreme
Court—seldom stray far from public opinion. Sometimes the
Supreme Court is slightly ahead of the wave of public opinion,
and sometimes slightly behind, but it is almost always carried
by the same tide.254
Some might object that the argument here is circular. We
are critiquing the entrenchment-based justification for special
constitutional argumentation by observing that the
Constitution is not especially or uniquely entrenching. But of
course, interpretation itself is largely responsible for constitutional change. Therefore, the objection might run, we cannot
fairly critique the entrenchment justification for special constitutional argument by pointing to the evolutionary outcome of
that argument. Interpreters take license with the text precisely
because it is so hard to amend, on this view.
252

See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
See Primus, supra note 13, at 1101 (“Prior to the twentieth century, wellsocialized American lawyers might have thought that, unless the Constitution
were amended, constitutional law could not possibly authorize Congress to enact
pervasive economic regulations, to delegate broad power to administrative agencies, or to prohibit racial discrimination in privately owned businesses. All those
things turned out to be possible without amendments.”).
254
See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 959, 981–83 (2004).
253
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This objection is understandable but mistaken. Our depiction of constitutional change is utterly independent of a commitment to any particular form of constitutional argument like
living constitutionalism. In fact, constitutional change is a reality for both conservatives and liberals alike. The form of that
change may be different. New originalists, for example, may
couch their strategies in historical discourse but the resulting
evolution in constitutional meaning is impossible to deny. The
Second Amendment means something different today than it
did two hundred years ago, as does the notion of equality and
due process of law.255 This is true regardless of the particular
form of interpretive argument that is being deployed.
So the Constitution is less entrenched than people sometimes assume, and the process of constitutional evolution is
not qualitatively different from the process of any legal change.
When the Supreme Court newly interprets “equal protection” to
include women, it is not doing anything inherently different
than when it expands the definition of “restraint of trade.”
More fundamentally, too, the difficulty of the Article V
amendment process generates, if anything, conflicting interpretive impulses. On the one hand, the Constitution’s relative
rigidity may well militate in favor of greater interpretive flexibility. From the perspective of living constitutionalists, the
Constitution’s rigidity is an infirmity to be overcome. Deadhand control is inherently antidemocratic unless interpretive
flexibility can ensure that the Constitution remains responsive
to today’s needs. On the other hand, however, the difficulty of
formally amending the Constitution might counsel for greater
reverence. Interpretation, in this view, should be exceptionally
conservative, to honor this constitutional design. Anything
else is, to borrow a well-turned phrase, “antientrenchment and
therefore anticonstitutional.”256
In a very real sense, then, current constitutional debate
involves an overarching question about how entrenching the
Constitution should be. But the fact of this debate reveals—at
the very least—that constitutional meaning does change. The
frequency and extent of those changes demonstrate that constitutional meaning is not uniquely or even unusually fixed.
255
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and
Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009) (arguing that originalism leaves
plenty of room for constitutional change in practice and is, therefore, “conservatives’ living constitution”); see also BALKIN, supra note 188, at 103–04, 280–81
(arguing that the shift from original intent and original understanding to original
meaning becomes a form of living constitutionalism).
256
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 21, at 226.
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Here, again, the Constitution is more continuous with ordinary
law than people generally believe, and the formal differences
that exist do not generate particular interpretive approaches or
outcomes.
C. Supremacy
If the Constitution’s exceptionalism cannot be justified by
its entrenchment, what about its status as supreme law? This
is one attribute that undeniably sets the document apart. It
means that the Constitution prevails over all other law when
conflicts arise. A familiar decision rule generates this attribute.
And only one source of law can claim that status, by definition.
A stronger version of this argument holds that the
Constitution is not only supreme in the sense of a simple decision rule but in the further sense that it is “basic” or “fundamental” law—or, to use exactly the opposite special metaphor,
it is “higher” law. According to this version, the Constitution
articulates principles that are more foundational (or lofty) than
the values embedded in ordinary statutes and common-law
doctrines. Supremacy can be thought of as a form of authority,
in other words, as well as an attribute.
On either of these versions, some might plausibly argue
that the Constitution’s supremacy properly drives special
forms of interpretive argument. Lawyers should understand
that the Constitution is doing something different from ordinary law, and they should interpret it accordingly. That is one
way of understanding Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition.257
Constitutional rules establish a framework of governmental
powers and individual rights that works differently from laws
operating within that framework, and they should be construed
in that light.
An initial question about this way of thinking is whether
the supremacy attribute in fact isolates the Constitution. As
we have seen, the text actually can be trumped by convictions
that are deeply held and widely shared. In fact, this has happened repeatedly. To use the example we have referred to
before, equal protection rules apply against the federal government despite the text of the Fifth Amendment. When language
like that runs up against strong values like the idea that the
District of Columbia should not be able to segregate its public
schools on the basis of race, it yields.258 Of course, courts
257
258

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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finesse that fact by calling the new, unwritten rule constitutional, but that begs the question by simply attaching a label to
whatever law in fact is supreme. As another example, think of
the rule that presidents may only serve for two terms. Although supreme today, in the sense that no political actor
would think to violate it, and although supreme earlier in
American history after it was established by President George
Washington, the rule was not supreme in 1940, when
President Franklin D. Roosevelt ran for a third term
successfully.259
Even if that (admittedly controversial) contention is put to
one side and the Constitution is indeed taken to be supreme,
the more difficult question is what follows for interpretive argument. Consider first the thin version of the supremacy argument, according to which supremacy works as a simple
decision rule. Why should a rule like that yield interpretive
strategies that are as dramatically distinct as those that actually characterize legal practice? After all, there are lots of decision rules scattered throughout law—think of Chevron or
conflicts rules—and yet they are construed in ordinary ways.
Philip Hamburger has argued, based on historical evidence,
that judges and lawyers at the time of the founding simply
resolved conflicts between the Constitution and statutes in exactly the same way that they resolved conflicts between any two
sources of law, without the concept of “judicial review” or any
special interpretive arguments.260
Consider now the thicker version of the supremacy argument, for which principles like equal protection or enumerated
powers are foundational and therefore should be read differently from routine rules. This is an argument from authority.
We have already argued that certain commitments grounded in
statutes or common-law doctrines are equally foundational in
this sense. Commitments enshrined in statutes that came out
of the Second Reconstruction—for example, section 1983—are
also written in lofty language and rightly thought to be fundamental to American political life and to American citizenship.261 The right to vote does not have the status of higher
law, and it is not subject to special interpretive moves, and yet
it is equally basic to our society. So supremacy in this thicker
259

See Primus, supra note 13, at 1099–1100 (discussing that example).
HAMBURGER, supra note 11.
261
See Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1317 (“Although some statutes such as
the Sherman Act and section 1983 are open-textured like the Constitution, most
are relatively detailed.”).
260
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sense does not seem to be doing the justificatory work we are
looking for in this Part.
In sum, even if supremacy is an attribute that does set
apart constitutional law from other sources, and even if it represents a form of authority, its connection to distinctive interpretive argument is open to question. Certainly, its function as
a decision rule cannot do much to justify its interpretive exceptionalism. Its status as basic or higher law comes closer, but
even that characteristic runs up against the observation that
some statutory law also speaks in terms of profound principle.
Supremacy may give constitutional lawyers and scholars a
sense that their work is important, but it does little to explain
why they speak so strangely.
D. Perfectionism and Antiperfectionism
Could it be argued that what separates the Constitution
from other sources of law has to do with a normative evaluation? Perfectionists would argue that the Constitution is particularly attractive, at least once it is properly construed.262 It
reflects not only extraordinary democracy but also extraordinary wisdom. Evidence of that wisdom is that it has persisted
for so long, indicating not only that its framers and ratifiers had
foresight but also (and relatedly) that it has proven worthy of
public endorsement through several generations and under
historical conditions that have differed wildly. But again, it is
not popularity itself that drives this particular argument for
distinctiveness, but excellence.
Antiperfectionists agree that what distinguishes the
Constitution is normative, but they believe that such a consideration cuts in exactly the opposite direction—that the document is particularly blameworthy rather than particularly
praiseworthy. On this view, the Constitution has characteristics that are variously seen to be (1) especially flawed, either
because they are undemocratic or unwise in some other way,
(2) not unusually flawed but unusually consequential because
of the Constitution’s legal and political importance, or (3) not
unusually flawed but unusually entrenched against
improvement.263
262
See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,
374–81 (1981); Mark Tushnet, “Our Perfect Constitution” Revisited, in TERRORISM,
THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES 131,
131–33 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005).
263
See Monaghan, supra note 262, at 357–58.
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A recent wave of scholarship questions the widespread assumption that the Constitution is worthy of high regard as a
matter of political morality.264 Generally, this literature argues
that aspects of American government are undemocratic—think
of the Senate or the Electoral College—or that they do not work
particularly well under contemporary conditions—think of bicameralism or the permissibility of partisan gerrymandering.
These critics do not usually argue that the Constitution is
uniquely blameworthy. Yet their arguments could be deployed
by antiperfectionists to that end.
We doubt that either of these positions can be maintained.
It would be surprising if the Constitution were found to be
either specially praiseworthy or specially blameworthy as a
matter of political morality. Of course, it may be the case that
framers like James Madison were people of uncommon wisdom
and that the document reflects that wisdom.265 Yet members
of that generation enacted statutes as well, some of which are
still good law today, and those presumably reflect the same sort
of competence. Moreover, it is likely that there are at least
some other statutes in effect today that are the products of
political leaders with similar levels of ability. Conversely, to the
degree that the Constitution is flawed—something we think is
obvious but culturally underappreciated—it shares that feature with many other laws. Neither attractiveness nor repulsiveness is likely to be a distinctive attribute of the
Constitution.
Moreover, even if perfectionism or antiperfectionism
turned out to be accurate, it is not clear what would follow for
interpretive argument. Should a bad constitution be construed
so that it does as little harm as possible—something like
Dworkinian theory as damage control—or should its flaws be
highlighted, so that efforts to amend it are empowered—in the
spirit of legal positivism? More specifically, can either perfec264

See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006)
(arguing that many of the Constitution’s provisions promote either unjust or
ineffective government); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE
(2012) (arguing that in order to progress, we should treat the Constitution as
inspiration, not as a set of commands).
265
See Kent Greenawalt, The Original Understanding of the Establishment
Clause, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 352 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012) (arguing that
the framers’ wisdom provides a reason to value original intent). But see WALTER M.
MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963)
(noting that Garrison called the Constitution a “covenant with death and an
agreement with hell”).
THE
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tionism or antiperfectionism justify any of the distinctive moves
that we argued in Part I characterize actual legal practice?
Possibly, perfectionism is connected to the relative disregard for the text that we have described. But the connection is
not a causal one: it is not that normative approval drives looser
attention to the text but rather that interpretive freedom is a
mechanism for realizing perfectionism itself—a method for
guaranteeing the text’s attractiveness, not a consequence of
that characteristic. So described, this move is a means for
achieving the Constitution’s specialness and not an independent justification for that specialness. It could be driven by an
altogether different consideration—such as a belief that the
document is unusually entrenched and therefore must be liberally construed if normative ends are to be achieved (or disasters avoided).
Another possibility is that the document’s excellence drives
distinctive types of historical argument. But this, too, is far
from obvious. In fact, originalism claims as one of its chief
virtues that it operates independent of any assessment of the
law’s desirability and that it thereby protects the rule of law.266
And as actually practiced, originalism appears to operate less
on an assumption that the entire document is normatively attractive and more with the view that certain parts of the
Constitution are worthy of preservation—especially parts
drafted by prominent framers. And that is not a judgment that
should separate it from other laws drafted by those historical
figures.
Our main conviction, however, is that neither perfectionism nor antiperfectionism hold as normative evaluations that
can distinguish the Constitution from other sources of law. We
think it is significant in this regard that no prominent scholar
has taken such a position, to our knowledge. And even if the
Constitution is distinctively praiseworthy or blameworthy, it is
hard to see how either of those attributes drives the particular
types of interpretive argument that we charted in Part I.
E. Democratic Legitimacy
Thirty-five years after the Constitution was ratified, James
Madison wrote that “the guide in expounding [the Constitution]” should be “the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the
266

See Whittington, supra note 3, at 602.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN303.txt

764

unknown

Seq: 64

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-MAR-16

9:40

[Vol. 101:701

legitimate Constitution.”267 Two claims in this passage are
widely accepted even today: first, that the Constitution’s authority is grounded in its democratic character, and second,
that this claim to legitimacy should drive contemporary understanding of the document and implementation of its provisions
as law.268 Madison’s approach connects claims about constitutional attributes, authority, and argument. Commerce
Clause or equal protection law is distinctive because of its democratic mandate, it is authoritative because of that earlier moment of popular agreement, and it should be understood and
implemented accordingly.
Our focus is not so much on the merits of this approach
but, as always, on its distinctiveness. In this subpart, we evaluate two varieties of the argument for constitutional exceptionalism based on democratic legitimacy: that the Constitution
was ratified in an earlier moment of history by a supermajority
of citizens, and that it continues to enjoy overwhelming popular
support today.
1. Original democratic authority.—One could understand
the first claim as contractarian: the Constitution carries legal
authority because of popular agreement at the time of ratification.269 Article V sets out processes of proposal and ratification
that define the legal conditions under which a law can claim
constitutional status, and those conditions are designed to
guarantee a certain level of supermajoritarian support.270 So
passing through the procedures of Article V gives the text not
only legal legitimacy but also popular or democratic legitimacy.
Once established at the moment of ratification, that legitimacy
then carries forward until a subsequent moment of repeal, and
it rightly binds both future governments and future majorities,
measured in the ordinary way.271 Furthermore, no other law in
267
Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 803, 803 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
268
See Samaha, supra note 99, at 610 (describing how Madison’s contractarianism theory is accepted today and that a theory of authority drives the
interpretation).
269
See id. (identifying this contractarian claim).
270
See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 11, at 2 (arguing that originalism is
defensible because it protects constitutional understandings that were enacted
under supermajority rules); see generally Frederic Bloom & Nelson Tebbe,
Countersupermajoritarianism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 809 (2015) (reviewing McGinnis &
Rappaport).
271
Ackerman’s theory counts as contractarian in this way, even though it is
not focused on Article V, because it grounds the Constitution’s legitimacy in
moments of higher lawmaking that then differentiate higher law from ordinary law
until subsequent moments of constitutional change. It differs, however, insofar
as it allows conceptual space to declare similarly authoritative statutes and other
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the U.S. system is subject to these elevated requirements for
passage or amendment. And the argument concludes by connecting these moments of extraordinary lawmaking with contemporary interpretive discourse, saying that the document
should be understood in a way that faithfully follows the historical moment in which it was adopted by the people.
This first contractarian version is subject to several objections. One is the simple point that ratification has not always
guaranteed supermajoritarian support as we would understand it today. In 1789 and 1791, of course, the group of
people eligible to vote was restricted in ways that we would
today call grossly undemocratic: according to characteristics of
race, gender, and class.272 If the original document could
claim legitimacy at the moment of its ratification, then, it was a
legal and not a democratic type of authority. And, as Bruce
Ackerman has famously argued, the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified in a way that cannot be said to have followed
Article V in any straightforward sense.273 Whether a
supermajority of states would have ratified the Reconstruction
Constitution without outside pressure is open to serious question. These are all familiar problems with a contractarian approach to the Constitution’s democratic authority.
Moreover, it is quite possible that some nonconstitutional
laws were enacted with similar levels of support by the people.
If so, they could claim a similar quantity and quality of democratic authority that should drive similar interpretive moves
today (although admittedly they would not have the same legal
authority). Think for instance of Ackerman’s account of passage of the New Deal settlement’s major elements—social security, entitlement-based health care programs, labor laws,
and other basic building blocks of the administrative state.274
All of these claimed levels of support at the time they were
laws as “constitutional” if they enjoy similar support. Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742–52 (2007) (assessing the possibility
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other major achievements of the Second
Reconstruction enjoy constitutional status).
272
See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 406, 420 (1989) (“Slaves and even free blacks, women, and persons without
sufficient property, were not eligible to vote.”).
273
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–120
(1998). But see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 364–80
(2005) (critiquing the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in a
manner that violated Article V).
274
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 47–57 (1991)
(describing mounting support for New Deal legislation during President
Roosevelt’s first term and then decisive support at the time of his reelection in
1936).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN303.txt

766

unknown

Seq: 66

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-MAR-16

9:40

[Vol. 101:701

enacted that rivaled those of constitutional amendments.275
President Roosevelt ran on the strength of his legislative program, and he won reelection in 1936 by a record margin.276
Another difficulty with the contractarian view is that it may
not be a convincing account of legitimacy at all. Even if the
Constitution can claim to have been adopted in a way that was
extraordinarily democratic at the time—in other words, even if
this is a unique attribute—that is not a convincing account of
why the document should be regarded as having unusual authority today. The chief objection to contractarianism in contemporary scholarship is the dead hand problem. Why should
adoption by a (counterfactually properly constituted)
supermajority at some time in the past give the Constitution
power to trump ordinary political majorities today? After all, no
one alive today voted for any provision of the Constitution. Is
there a good reason to give past majorities, or even
supermajorities, a veto over today’s law?277 If the Constitution
were easy to amend, this objection would have less force—
people today could simply amend or repeal provisions that had
lost popular support. But because the Constitution is hard to
change formally, even by extraordinarily large supermajorities,
the dead hand problem is difficult to overcome. Some other
argument for its special authority must be found.
2. Contemporary popular support.—Another possibility is
that the Constitution enjoys a unique level of popular support
today. This argument is based on contemporary political conditions. Although we live in an era that many people perceive
as unusually polarized politically and culturally, the
Constitution seems to garner admiration and adherence from
virtually all facets of American society.278 We will return to this
fact as a cultural phenomenon below. For now, we treat it as a
political reality. On this account, the Constitution’s extraordinary popularity lends it distinctively powerful authority, and
275
Id. at 311 (calling the democratic support of the founding-era Federalists
and Reconstruction Republicans “quite modest” in comparison to the electoral
support won in 1936).
276
Id. at 48 (emphasizing the importance of a “clear victory” in 1936 for communicating a mandate to Congress—and to the Court); ACKERMAN, supra note 273,
at 310 (calling the 1936 election “the greatest victory in American history” for
“Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress”).
277
Of course, the dead hand argument can be directed at nonconstitutional
laws as well. See Samaha, supra note 99, at 609 (noting this feature). But that
only further reduces its claim to special status. Our point here is that this particular claim to the Constitution’s (special) democratic authority runs into the dead
hand problem, not that other laws might not run into it as well.
278
See Rana, supra note 11, at 337.
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that in turn mandates (or at least justifies) special interpretive
arguments.
Yet of course, there are serious problems with this claim as
well. An initial problem is that its support today seems almost
entirely independent of its content. Think for example of the
Electoral College, which has problems that have become widely
appreciated, especially after the election of 2000, which nearly
caused a constitutional crisis and which was “resolved” only by
the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.279 It is also hard to imagine that a supermajority of Americans would vote to continue
the Senate, with its countermajoritarian design. Article V itself
has obvious problems that should doom it in the eyes of Americans who have considered them. And yet all of these provisions
would be subject to the sorts of interpretive moves that characterize constitutional discourse, as we argued in Part I.
Moreover, some statutes and common-law rules can boast
equivalent or superior levels of popularity. Even if the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was more controversial at the time it was
adopted, it became a foundational part of American law. It is
impossible to imagine the legal regime without a federal rule
against employment discrimination on the basis of race or gender, or without protection against discriminatory exclusion
from public accommodations like restaurants, hotels, or theaters. Protections like these are now considered basic to citizenship, understood as full membership in the political and social
community.280 That sense could change, but meanwhile it remains consequential. Similarly, statutes that extend voting
rights to the public are now properly regarded as basic, even
though (or because) the Constitution does not provide a right to
vote in crucial contests like presidential elections and local
political contests. It is not difficult to think of additional examples of nonconstitutional laws that rival constitutional ones in
their contemporary popularity.281
279

531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215, 1237–42 (2001) (describing how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has become a
“super-statute” and has “entrenched its norm into American public life”); Ackerman, supra note 271, at 1750 (arguing that the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965
have constitutional status).
281
This is not limited to rights. Laws that protect wetlands and bald eagles
have worked their way into the background expectations of most Americans.
While the precise content of environmental laws remains subject to fierce debate,
few people today believe that bald eagle hunting should be a permitted sport. But
see Johnny Kelly, American Bald Eagle Shot Dead in Mississippi, Hunters Arrested, EXAMINER (Dec. 22, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/
american-bald-eagle-shot-dead-mississippi-hunters-arrested [http://perma.cc/
280
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So democratic authority defined as contemporary support
from the people is not even a unique attribute of constitutional
provisions, let alone a source of unique authority. Therefore, it
should not be able to drive targeted strategies of interpretive
argument.
But can it still provide a different type of authority, if the
Constitution overall garners greater popularity than any statute or common-law rule? Perhaps it can. Yet it is hard to see
how that would provide a reason to adopt special interpretive
strategies as to particular provisions. In other words, that sort
of general authority does not translate directly, or even particularly well, into interpretive strategies that are currently directed
toward every constitutional provision, no matter how broadly
acclaimed.282
That observation can be generalized. Democratic legitimacy is a kind of authority theory for the Constitution, of
which there are of course others. Think for instance of claims
that the Constitution is normatively optimal or just desirable in
one way or another. Or the entrenchment attribute that we
have considered could be imagined as an authority theory, if
stability in some Burkean sense can be understood as grounding a claim to legitimacy or authority.283 Any of these could
drive a claim to unique constitutional legitimacy or authority.
We would be skeptical of any such claims because nonconstitutional laws could almost certainly be found that were equally
attractive or equally stable. Yet even if authority theories could
provide the basis for claims to uniqueness, they might have
difficulty driving the interpretive practices we argued exist in
Part I. That is because, as Adam Samaha has argued, “with
respect to the Constitution, it is difficult to find any authority
theory that is both persuasive and logically connected to interpretive method.”284 Samaha was not writing about constitutional exceptionalism in this passage, but his observation helps
us to establish that the connection between constitutional authority and constitutional interpretation is fraught and thereR2JJ-PHCR] (“There is one less American bald eagle flying around to represent as
the country’s national symbol after hunters shot one dead in Mississippi earlier
this month. . . . [Two people] were being charged in connection with the illegal
killing of an American bald eagle . . . .”).
282
This kind of support shades into cultural veneration, which we address
below in subpart II.G.
283
For a discussion of Burkean theory’s emphasis on tradition as a source of
authority, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 648–56 (1994).
284
Samaha, supra note 99, at 611. But see Raz, supra note 221, at 157–69
(arguing for connection between authority and interpretation).
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fore will have trouble justifying contemporary lawyerly
discourse.
F. Polythetic Specialness
Usually, when people want to figure out whether something is unique, they look for a single characteristic that sets it
apart from everything else that might seem similar. So far in
the argument, we have been using something like this
monothetic approach to identify distinguishing characteristics
that might justify constitutionalism. But maybe the
Constitution is special in a different way. Maybe what sets it
apart is that no other source of law has this combination of
characteristics. Biologists have recognized a polythetic approach to classification of life forms; sharing a sufficient cluster
of characteristics is enough to identify members of a classification—say, a species or genus—rather than a single unifying
attribute that all members share and that is shared by no
nonmembers.285 From the natural sciences, polythetic approaches have spread into the social sciences and
humanities.286
Constitutional scholars might think about their subject
that way—they might argue that no other source of law boasts
this particular combination of attributes. Others take something quite like a polythetic approach when they argue that
legal rules should be classified as “constitutional” if they display a sufficient quantity (or the right combination of) features.
These are features normally associated with the classification
as a whole, no one of which is necessary or sufficient alone to
qualify a legal rule as part of higher law.287
In some sense, it is obviously true that the Constitution
displays a combination of characteristics not shared by any
other source of law. If that were not the case, it would not be
possible to speak meaningfully of constitutional law at all. No
other source of law claims to be amendable only through Article
V procedures, can trump every other source of law in the event
of a conflict, enjoys near-universal respect, and so on. Yet that
claim is as unilluminating as it is correct. To agree to it is
simply to affirm that we can talk about the Constitution and
know what it is that we are talking about.
285
See JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN 4–5
(1982).
286
See id. at 4 (applying the approach to the definition of religion).
287
See Primus, supra note 12 (manuscript at 1–5).
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Yet perhaps it is possible, in a more profound way, to argue
that the combination of attributes—entrenchment, supremacy,
and the rest—combine to legitimize special interpretive arguments in a way that no one feature can on its own. This would
be a polythetic approach not just to classification but also to
justification. On this theory, the combination of entrenchment
and supremacy makes sense of, say, inattention to the text or
unique forms of structural reasoning. We can imagine how this
might work: entrenchment is one thing, but entrenchment plus
supremacy is particularly powerful and demands rethinking
how we normally approach the text of a law or inferences from
the structure of government that it erects.
One trouble, of course, is that not every provision of the
Constitution combines even the attributes thought essential to
status as “constitutional,” and yet they all are subject to the
special interpretive moves that we identified in Part I. Even if
this strong form of the argument is controversial, it doubtless
is much less controversial that there is a mismatch between
whatever combination of features is thought to qualify a rule as
constitutional under a polythetic approach and the widespread
interpretive specialness that lawyers observe in practice.
Taking just the most obvious examples, the Equal Protection Clause is supreme but not entrenched in its meaning, as
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges288 has
shown by changing the substantive rights of same-sex couples
to marry. That provision is both supreme to state law, including state constitutional law, and fully capable of keeping up
with nationwide politics, even ones that have changed as
quickly and as sweepingly as those surrounding same-sex
marriage.289 And the Privileges and Immunities Clause is arguably entrenched but not supreme—it has functionally been
written out of the Fourteenth Amendment since Reconstruction.290 Moreover, several statutes have turned out to be both
288

135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE x–xii (2013) (describing the rapid, almost unprecedented speed of success for the gay rights movement).
290
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75–81 (1873); see also
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects rights of newly arrived state citizens to the same privileges
and immunities as other citizens of the state, such as rights to welfare benefits).
Of course, this decision could be cited as evidence that the meaning of the clause
has indeed changed, but overall the Privileges and Immunities Clause is remarkable for its entrenchment, not its flexibility. So far, Saenz has turned out to be an
outlier, not the harbinger of reinvigoration.
289
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entrenched against attack and supreme as against state
law.291
Overall, then, we see little evidence that a polythetic approach to the Constitution can produce a justification for specialized interpretation that somehow does more work than
individual rationales, considered separately. That would take
an alchemy that remains obscure to us. And revealingly, no
theorist has made such an argument. We think any such effort
would be unavailing.
G. Constitutional Culture
The strongest justification for the way lawyers think and
talk about the Constitution trades on its place in American
culture, politics, and society. Without a doubt, the
Constitution occupies a distinctive place in American self-conceptions. It serves as a signifier of the political community and
of membership in that community. It provides a locus for rituals that affirm the American narrative of revolution, slavery,
civil strife, industrial transformation, world wars, the civil
rights movement, and continuing progress toward democracy
and equal liberty. In short, the Constitution provides both a
central symbol and the authoritative text for American legal
mythology. Therefore, when a political actor invokes the Constitution, the claim not only supports whatever substantive
position that person may be advocating but also performs a
ritual function of marking the actor’s identity as a patriotic
member of the political community and of shoring up the idea
of that community itself.
Our argument here has a circular quality—we are saying
that the Constitution is special precisely insofar as it is thought
to be special by participants in the culture of the nation. But to
the extent that social meanings have a reality that is separate
from the will of any particular individual, even though they are
socially constructed, the contention we are examining has
force. Lawyers direct special interpretive moves toward the
Constitution because it is venerated, and that is true independent of whether a particular jurist dissents from that view.
Reverence for the Constitution is a fact independent of any
291
To take just one example, consider preemption by the Sherman Antitrust
Act. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (“In determining
whether the Sherman Act pre-empts a state statute, we apply principles similar to
those which we employ in considering whether any state statute is pre-empted by
a federal statute pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.”).
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individual’s evaluation of that status, even though it is historically contingent.
Justifying lawyerly argument on the basis of cultural status requires a connection between popular and professional
discourses. Presumably, the idea is that American culture includes as one of its features an elevated status for the
Constitution, and a popular conception like that—in which
lawyers participate as ordinary citizens—helps to account for
special argumentation among professionals.292 Beyond that,
the cultural justification need not take a more particularized
position on the relationship between popular and professional
discourses, a relationship that is complex and somewhat obscure.293 It need only establish that lawyers participate in, and
to some degree are influenced by, a cultural complex in which
the Constitution is aligned with other deep features such as
national identity, patriotism, American exceptionalism, a conception of progress, and the like.
Originalism’s appeal comes as much from its resonance
with the special place of the Constitution in national myth and
ritual as it does from any theoretical arguments that it has
offered in its support or even from political support for its assumed outcomes in cases.294 Jamal Greene is surely right that
certain features of originalism in practice—its privileging of the
subjective intent of founders like Madison and Hamilton, on
the one hand,295 and its relative inattention to either the original meaning or the original intent of the Reconstruction
Amendments, on the other296—are both inconsistent with the
purported fidelity of the new originalism to original meanings
and also readily explainable if what carries authority is the
Constitution’s mythic status, and the special place of iconic
292
Conceivably, the Constitution has a status in professional culture that is
entirely independent of its place in the lay worldview, but that seems unlikely to
us.
293
Cf. Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling
Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 358 (2011) (describing “two related but
distinct conversations, one popular and the other professional” while acknowledging that “the precise relationship between them is mysterious”).
294
See id. at 411–12 (finding, based on empirical data, that support for
originalism is predicted by several attitudes, including support for the rule of law,
endorsement of conservative political outcomes, and cultural location as indicated by moral traditionalism and economic libertarianism); id. at 412 (emphasizing the authors’ conclusion that cultural factors are significant predictors of
originalist views). William Baude has recently offered a version of this same
argument. See Baude, supra note 3, 2366.
295
See Greene, supra note 111, at 1685.
296
See Greene, supra note 122, at 978–79.
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framers in American legal mythology.297 One way to make
sense of this is to draw on the distinction between interpretation and construction, and to say that original meaning matters to the former but not to the latter, where the Constitution’s
authority in the culture becomes paramount.298 Another (compatible) way is to see that originalists are leveraging the
Constitution’s distinctive place in American traditions.
Of course, nonoriginalists also trade on the Constitution’s
cultural authority. They habitually look to constitutional law
and politics as privileged sites of progressive reform, even while
recognizing that constitutional law has a checkered record of
delivering on its egalitarian potential, to say the least.299 This
presents a puzzle—why should progressives continue to turn to
constitutional law despite many disappointments?—but it is
one that can be solved by recognizing that adherents of the socalled living Constitution, like originalists, recognize and deploy the special authority that the document and the doctrine
surrounding it carry in the national psyche.
So the Constitution is in fact special in its cultural mythology. This is a statement about constitutional authority, among
other things. What follows for interpretive argument by
lawyers?
Remarkably little, as it turns out. Authority has less to do
with argument than many suppose, as we have argued generally, and it underdetermines interpretation here as well. After
all, the Constitution’s status in American legal mythology is
relatively independent of its content and has much more to do
with its symbolism and ritual functions. That is why both liberals and conservatives can pay homage to the document, bolstering its cultural authority, while disagreeing markedly about
its legal content and political ideology. While the Constitution
may not be an entirely empty signifier, its significance as a
national icon surely does not specify its legal substance—it
does so neither as a political matter nor among legal professionals. Authority does not yield argument in any simple way.
Perhaps there are smaller-scale consequences for interpretation, however. For instance, it is possible to argue that the
Constitution’s cultural resonance, combined with the difficulty
297

See Greene, supra note 111, at 1696; Greene, supra note 122, at 980.
See Greene, supra note 111, at 1684.
299
Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011,
2054 (2012) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 88; STRAUSS, supra note 34) (warning
progressive political actors not to succumb to the “cult of constitution worship”
without realizing the danger of shoring up an “undead Constitution” (quoting
LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 9 (1955)).
298
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of amendment, counsels the looser approach to text that we see
in practice, as compared to statutory interpretation. Or perhaps those same features suggest that lawyers should treat
precedent in the area differently from how they treat decisions
interpreting statutes or the common law. Or maybe its cultural
status even explains the existence of structural argumentation
in constitutional law and not in other places where you might
expect it.
We think arguments like these could possibly succeed.
Conceivably, the Constitution’s central place in American legal
mythology could translate into distinctive interpretive moves.
Additional work would be necessary to discover just where and
how much this is the case.
What seems clear to us, however, is that this one feature of
higher law cannot possibly justify the sharply divergent modes
of understanding that lawyers in fact direct toward Article I, the
Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction Amendments, and every
other discrete provision. Overinclusiveness plagues that effort.300 Many provisions of the Constitution do not participate
in the document’s overall standing in American culture and
politics, and yet they are routinely subject to the same sort of
legal methodologies applied to its more iconic provisions.
Think for instance of the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, the
Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement for criminal juries,
or the Seventh Amendment’s jury guarantee for civil cases,
none of which has been regarded as fundamental enough to be
incorporated against the states.301 Or think of the Contracts
Clause.302 Preemption doctrine is another terrific example.303
In all of these areas, there is a gap between cultural authority
and the interpretive practices of legal professionals that we
outlined in Part I. We think this point should resonate intui300
Underinclusiveness also is a problem, arguably, because several artifacts
of the national culture carry authority that is comparable to that of the
Constitution, including especially the Declaration of Independence, but also arguably the Gettysburg Address and the separation of church and state passage
from Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists. Yet these documents are not
legal, so they do not challenge the Constitution’s claim to special status among
sources of law.
301
U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII; see also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S.
740, 748 (1948) (holding that unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the
Sixth Amendment applies); Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights
After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 160 (2012) (noting that
none of these provisions have been incorporated against the states).
302
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
303
See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2000) (“[C]ourts
have treated the Supremacy Clause chiefly as a symbol—a rhetorical expression
of federal dominance, but a provision with little practical content of its own.”).
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tively with most lawyers—the Constitution’s elevated cultural
status has little to do with how the document gets handled in
courtrooms and briefs, and it is difficult to articulate any convincing connection.
That is not to say, again, that connections could not be
made. But the chance that they will yield precisely the ways of
working that are observed among contemporary lawyers and
no others strikes us as exceedingly small. Once again, the
relationship between authority and argument seems to be better characterized by disjuncture than by correlation, let alone
causation.
CONCLUSION
Why should it matter whether lawyers construe the
Constitution differently from other sources of law? What would
change if our understanding were accepted, and would any
such change be salutary? Although our analysis of constitutional exceptionalism has value on its own terms, we reveal in
this conclusion one motivation for the project that is more
practical.
All too often, the Constitution functions as a blunt weapon
in ordinary politics. People invoke it hoping that it will have
nuclear force, obliterating whatever policy arguments have
been offered on the other side.304 And oftentimes it does have
remarkable power to shut down conversation, or to force the
opposition to escalate its own rhetoric to match the constitutional level. Because of the Constitution’s authoritative status
in mainstream America, that strategy also can work to stifle the
voices of marginalized citizens.
One part of why this tactic works, when it does, is because
of the cultural authority that we described in the last subpart.
Political actors invoke America’s basic law because of the
weight it carries not just as a technical legal matter but in
society more generally. One interesting consequence is that
constitutional argument in ordinary politics is often merely
symbolic and unrelated to the Constitution’s content. For example, virtually none of the heightened firearm regulations
that were proposed in the wake of shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, would have violated the Second Amendment under
304
Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631, 651 (1999) (describing one case where constitutional arguments were used to “evade responsibility” for hard political choices).
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controlling doctrine, despite strong rhetoric to the contrary.305
Even Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, contemplated regulation of weapons that are high powered, concealed, used in
sensitive places, and so forth.306
Part of why the tactic of constitutional exaggeration
works—again, to the degree that it does—is that invocations of
the Constitution trade on, or leverage, legal argumentation.
Political actors gain support from the standing of the
Constitution among lawyers who accept the idea that the
Constitution is distinctive, and distinctively authoritative, as a
source of law. Professional usage helps to make constitutional
law politically potent. Like a loaded gun left lying around, constitutional law can be taken up by political actors and discharged as a blunderbuss.
It is not entirely quixotic to think that lawyerly practices
can be altered in their treatment of the Constitution, even if it
would be much more difficult to change American thinking
more generally on the matter. And if we are right that the
exceptionalism of constitutional argument among legal professionals is not adequately supported by any of the reasons that
they would give, then they might be persuaded to treat constitutional law more like other law in interpretive argument. Interpretive pluralism would be openly embraced and would be
seen to work in much the same way in constitutional, statutory, and common-law contexts. That would help to demythologize the Constitution, at least among trained lawyers, and it
would undercut the ability of other political actors to use the
instrument for pure political warfare. It would help to lower the
stakes of political argumentation around a range of core issues
in contemporary American politics. That might be an
improvement.

305
See Ed O’Keefe & Philip Rucker, Gun-control Overhaul Is Defeated in Senate, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/guncontrol-overhaul-is-defeated-in-senate/2013/04/17/57eb028a-a77c-11e2b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html [https://perma.cc/BG5C-92Z4] (“The president
lashed out at the National Rifle Association for having ‘willfully lied’ about the
background-check proposal to stoke fear among gun rights supporters that Congress would violate their Second Amendment rights . . . .”).
306
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (limiting protection to weapons in common use); id. at 626 (allowing restrictions on concealed
weapons, sensitive places, felons and the mentally ill, and conditions on commercial sale), id. at 632 (allowing regulation of gun storage). But see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down an Illinois law that was the
nation’s only complete ban on concealed weapons).

